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1I. INTRODUCTION 
Why does the United States continue to deploy nearly 100,000 active duty 
military personnel in Northeast Asia?  Why, after President Bush proposed to withdraw 
as many as 70,000 forces from overseas bases around the world, are most of the forces in 
Asia projected to remain?  Many analysts have presented arguments in favor of 
withdrawing U.S. military forces from overseas locations, while others, primarily in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) argued to leave forces in place or even increase military 
presence.  From a historical perspective, American military personnel have been 
stationed in Japan, and South Korea over fifty years; the mechanism for these 
deployments is the U.S. bilateral alliances with each country.  The outbreak of war on the 
Korean peninsula in 1950 pitted the Soviet and Chinese-backed-North Korean military 
against the American, United Nations, and South Korean forces.  According to Blackwill 
and Dibb, the U.S.-Japan alliance was traditionally intended to curb the spread of 
communism in Asia.1  The end of the Cold War in 1991 eliminated the Soviet communist 
threat in the Pacific region.  One of the main premises for developing the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and for keeping U.S. military forces in the region dissolved, causing some 
analysts to call for the removal of U.S. forces.2  In recommending troop withdrawal, Ivan 
Eland argued that the United States tends to overstate regional threats that may never 
develop into credible threats.3 
While some threats dissipated, other threats remained and replaced old ones, 
including the real North Korean and terrorist threats and the perceived China threat.  In 
2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that America will not yield its strategic 
position in Asia because the U.S. military is crucial to stability.4  Garrett and Glaser also 
argued that if U.S. troops are removed from Korea and Japan, instability would reign, 
                                                 
1 Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., America’s Asian Alliances, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 
31. 
2 Doug Bandow, “Cutting the Tripwire:  It’s Time to Get Out of Korea,” Reason Online, 
http://reason.com July 2003, 3. 
3 Ivan Eland, “Tilting at Windmills:  Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security,” Cato Institute, 
Policy Analysis, No. 332, 8 February 1999. 
4 Colin Powell in AFX News Limited, “US Military Key to Stability in Asia – Powell,” AFX European 
Focus, 11 June 2002. 
2arms races would ensue, and Japan might even decide to remilitarize and develop nuclear 
weapons.5  On 11 March 2003, South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun advocated 
maintaining a strong U.S.-Korea alliance, stating that the defense arrangement with U.S. 
forces in Korea greatly contributes to national security.6 
While there are tangible benefits to the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, 
including deterrence, security, regional access, and stronger political and economic ties, 
there are also tremendous costs.  According to Bandow, who insists that U.S. troops 
should come home, the cost of maintaining troops in South Korea alone is $13-14 billion 
dollars per year, while Japan bears roughly half the financial burden for hosting troops in 
Japan.7  One estimate indicates that without the Korean contingency, the United States 
would be able to reduce its military presence by about one-fourth, saving $20-$30 billion 
dollars annually.8 
In addition to the monetary costs, in some countries the troops are no longer 
welcomed by a majority of the populace.  In both South Korea and Japan, nationalism has 
been on the rise.  These nationalistic feelings often translated into anti-American 
sentiment.  A public opinion poll in 2003 indicated that seven out of ten South Koreans 
want the U.S. military out of Korea.9  According to Ralph Cossa, who also argues for 
withdrawing U.S. troops, the United States has always said that it would maintain troops 
in South Korea as long as the Korean people and government wanted them and as long as 
the threat remained.10  The growing anti-Americanism brings this policy into question.  
The  situation  in  Japan  is  not  much  better.   According  to  Richard  Halloran,  who  is  
                                                 
5 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1997, 383-402. 
6 Lee, Soo-jeong, “South Korean President Calls for Stronger South Korea-U.S. Alliance,” Associated 
Press, 11 March 2003. 
7 Doug Bandow, “Free Rider:  South Korea’s Dual Dependence on America,” Cato Institute, Policy 
Analysis No. 308, 19 May 1998, 3. 
8 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, (Princeton New Jersey:  Basic Books, 2001), 311. 
9 Jonathan Manthorpe, “Asia’s Anxious Dictator,” Vancouver Sun, 2 April 2003, A17. 
10 Ralph A. Cossa, Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, (Washington D.C.: The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 43. 
3adamant about returning U.S. troops to America, despite the 50-year alliance, 39 percent 
of the Japanese people polled by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo do not trust 
the United States.11 
According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the U.S. military is 
undergoing a transformation process that aims to construct an expeditionary force 
capable of global, rapid, and sustained response to deter, fight, and win wars.12  Despite 
this transformation and plans to consolidate troops into mobile hubs, this strategy calls 
for an increase of troops in Northeast Asia.13 
The basic arguments for removing troops from overseas boil down to beliefs that 
the threats have diminished; that overseas presence is too costly; military personnel are 
stretched too thin; that host nations can now fend for themselves; and that the host 
nation’s populace no longer wants a U.S. military presence.  The basic arguments for 
maintaining a military presence overseas can be summarized by the following:  threats to 
U.S. national interests have expanded; a military presence helps maintain peace and 
security because it demonstrates U.S. commitment, reassures allies and deters threats; and 
military presence saves deployment time when responding to a crisis in a remote region. 
Many of these arguments, while seemingly contradictory, are valid.  Some threats 
like the Soviet one have diminished, while others, like the terrorist threat and the threat of 
rogue states using WMD, have expanded.  Responding to the diminished Soviet threat, 
the United States has downsized its military forces.  On the other hand, responding to the 
expanding terrorist and rogue state threats, the United States has broadened its presence 
in remote countries and stretched its military thin.  Despite the rising nationalism around 
the world and the growing anti-American sentiment, many countries and many people 
still value and desire U.S. engagement because U.S. military presence does help maintain 
peace and security. 
 
                                                 
11 Richard Halloran, “Anti-Americanism in Seoul Korea,” Honolulu Star Bulletin, 21 July 2002, 1. 
12 Donald Rumsfeld, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” U.S. Department of Defense, 30 
September 2001, iii-iv. 
13 General Leon J. LaPorte, “Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander, United Nations 
Command,” Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony Before Subcommittee on 
Military Construction, 29 April 2003, 1-18. 
4The problem with these arguments is that they fail to recognize the capability of 
the military and the U.S. commitment to use the military as the critical elements to 
accomplishing objectives.  While U.S. military presence may help maintain peace and 
security, it may not be essential.  Peace and security, reassurance of allies and deterrence 
of potential enemies may be achieved without a permanent physical military presence.  
Military capability and the success of an objective are not necessarily limited or restricted 
by the physical presence of troops.  If the United States possessed laser weapons that 
could pinpoint and destroy targets around the globe with the push of a button, or if 
America possessed weapons that could selectively target and eliminate personnel based 
on their DNA, and potential enemies knew of these weapons and were convinced 
America would use them, military forces as we know them today might cease to exist.  
Though not to the same futuristic extent, America’s military capabilities have improved 
to the point that they can reach across the globe in a matter of days.  Relative to other 
nations’ militaries, the U.S. military instrument has been modified and modernized to the 
point where its asymmetric advantages in capability eclipse other forces and make it 
ludicrous to match force on force in the traditional sense.  Potential enemies are aware of 
U.S. capabilities and are aware of U.S. commitment to use them.  A major limiting factor 
to U.S. capability lies in its ability to gain access to a region; however, access is not 
guaranteed by physical presence, but may be garnered through political or diplomatic 
means. 
If military capability and the commitment to use it are essential elements in 
maintaining peace and stability, reassuring allies and deterring enemies, then it is 
important to focus on whether the United States possesses these abilities and is 
committed to use them to defend itself and its allies.  Examining U.S. military 
transformation efforts and the results of American conflicts since the end of the Cold War 
will help outline U.S. capabilities.  These same conflicts and an assessment of U.S.-
Philippines relations since the closure of U.S. bases and withdrawal of U.S. forces will 
help resolve the question about U.S. commitment.  Once capability and commitment 
concerns are satisfied, we can resolve issues of effective force-posture policy. 
5II. U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON 
CAPABILITY 
A. THREAT-BASED VS. CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCES 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dissipation of a traditional and 
credible conventional threat, the United States has been trying to come to grips with the 
changing international security environment.  In the absence of a clear, comparable 
threat, the dilemma has been how to structure U.S. military forces without compromising 
a technological lead and competitive edge over potential threats.  How can the United 
States build a force capable of defeating modern asymmetric threats while still 
maintaining the conventional power to face the more traditional conventional military 
threats?  If the military can build a force capable of handling both types of threats, how 
will this new capability affect the U.S. force posture around the world?  
“Transformation” became the buzz word for defining how the United States would adapt 
its Armed Forces to the changing security environment.   
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provided the transformation process with 
a new vision and determination, and the September 11 terrorist attacks added a sense of 
urgency and focus.  The United States has moved away from a threat-based strategy to a 
capabilities-based strategy, concerned not with who is doing the threatening but with how 
America is being threatened.  In contrast to developing forces from a specific threat or 
scenario, capabilities-based strategy is planning under uncertainty to provide capabilities 
suitable for a wide range of modern challenges and situations.14 
Emphasis has shifted from deliberate to adaptive planning and from permanent 
organizations and large hierarchies to smaller and highly distributed joint and combined 
forces and standing or contingency Joint Task Forces.  According to Joint Vision 2020, 
the overall goal of U.S. military transformation is to create a force that is dominant across 
the full spectrum of military operations, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent 
in any form of conflict.  Operational concepts include dominant maneuver, precision 
                                                 
14 Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on ‘21st Century Transformation’ of US Armed 
Forces (transcript of remarks and question and answer period),” (Washington D.C:  National Defense 
University, 31 January 2002). 
6engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.  Information operations 
and joint command and control are also essential.15 
To accomplish its transformational goals, the United States is investing $144 
billion through 2007.16  The Pentagon is focusing on a new strategy that shifts resources 
away from traditional, large-scale warfare to lighter, more lethal and more mobile forces 
for fighting terrorism, insurgencies, unconventional wars and asymmetric threats.  Based 
on these premises, wars of the future will not likely feature the traditional large armies 
and large navies.17  The plan calls for moving funds away from ships, aircraft, and tanks 
and toward Special Operations Forces and command, control, communications and 
computer capabilities.  In a speech on transformation trends, VADM Arthur Cebrowski, 
the lead person on DoD Transformation in 2002, reinforced Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision 
of transformation and added that in order to reduce the military footprint by 50 percent, 
America must substitute information for mass—the military must become more 
expeditionary, one that can operate without a forward infrastructure or have the capability 
to carry infrastructure forward.18 
Part of the Pentagon’s strategy is to build a surge force that can draw upon a 
global pool of forces that can respond faster and with more flexibility to crises.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld set a speed goal for the military.  He wants rotational forces to be able to 
deploy to a remote region within 10 days, conquer an enemy or exercise with an ally 
                                                 
15 Office of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Vision 2020:  America’s Military Preparing for 
Tomorrow,” Department of Defense, 2001.  
16 The six specific transformation goals identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review are as follows:  
defend the U.S. homeland and other bases of operation and defeat nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and their means of delivery; deny enemy sanctuary, depriving them of the ability to run or hide; 
project and sustain forces in distant theaters in the face of access denial threats; conduct effective 
operations in space; conduct effective information operations; and leverage information technology to give 
joint forces a common operational picture.  To protect bases of operations, America is developing missile 
defense.  Fast transport ships will help project power in denied areas.  Spaced-based radar systems will help 
deny enemy sanctuaries.  Laser technology is being developed for space operations.  The United States is 
improving its information and space warfare systems, and it already has developed joint task forces.  Paul 
Wolfowitz, “Testimony Delivered on Military Transformation Before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Hearing,” (Washington D.C.: 9 April 2002).   
17 Thomas E. Ricks, “Shift from Traditional War Seen at Pentagon,” Washington Post, 3 September 
2004, 1. 
18 Arthur Cebrowski, “Transformation Trends–17 Feb Issue, Speech by VADM Arthur Cebrowski to 
the Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference,” Arlington VA: Office of Force Transformation, 22 
January 2003. 
7within 30 days, and reconstitute fast enough to reengage another enemy or ally in a 
different part of the world 30 days later.  This strategy is transformational because it 
improves upon the traditional practice of allocating specific forces to regional 
commanders, who rely on them to execute war plans.19 
The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), under the leadership of Admiral Thomas 
Fargo has taken great strides in the journey to transform its armed forces by incorporating 
capabilities-based initiatives as well as by becoming a more expeditionary force.  
Admiral Fargo recognized that a true Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) could not 
occur through technological advancement alone but by transforming the doctrine, 
organization, leadership, and training used to parlay the technology into effective 
capability.  When referring to a regional combatant commander’s responsibility for 
implementing transformational guidance, Admiral Fargo described it as “operationalizing 
the Asian-Pacific defense strategy.”20 
In his testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, General James L. 
Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe expressed his belief that the strategic 
transformation campaign plan is founded on America’s need to remain globally engaged 
with allies and international institutions and it capitalizes on America’s military 
commitment and capabilities to face the challenges of the new century.21 
To support transformation and modernization efforts President Bush proposed a 
$401.7 billion dollar defense plan for 2005.  The defense budget proposal will continue 
                                                 
19 Jason Sherman, “U.S. Seeks to Add Flex to Force,” Defense News, 6 September 2004, 4. 
20 Admiral Fargo said there are six elements to this strategy:  update operational plans, strengthen 
command and control constructs to better respond to emerging security threats, develop expeditionary 
capabilities for immediate employment in the Pacific or anywhere else they are needed, integrate and co-
locate expeditionary forces with high-speed lift and interdiction assets, improve precision and lethality 
capabilities to enhance and reduce our force posture and footprint, and finally, gain access opportunities 
and preposition logistics throughout the theater.  Thomas Fargo, “America’s Forward Deployment in Asia 
and the Pacific,” Federal News Service, Inc., 26 June 2003.   
21 General Jones stated the transformation plan was based on several key assumptions:  the U.S. 
desires to maintain a position of global influence through effective use of all its instruments of power; the 
U.S. remains committed to its friends and allies through its organizations, institutions, and agreements; the 
U.S. remains committed to a global strategy with forward based and deployed forces as its cornerstone; the 
U.S. supports in-depth transformation of its armed forces and basing structure; the U.S. will seek to 
overcome obstacles posed by 21st century challenges; the U.S. basing within EUROCOM may not satisfy 
the challenges posed by an expanded NATO or the asymmetric challenges of the future; the U.S. will 
preserve assets of enduring value to its national interests.  General James L. Jones, “U.S. Senator Kay 
Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Overseas Installations,” Federal Document Clearing House 
Inc., 29 April 2003, 1-18.   
8on the growth path over the next five years that would carry it to Cold War levels.  Major 
portions of the spending are projected toward equipment upgrades, and research of new 
weapon systems.22    Some of these transformation dollars will also be used to upgrade 
military capabilities in Korea.  Paul Wolfowitz indicated that about $11 billion dollars 
would be spent over the next four years in some 150 programs to enhance U.S. 
capabilities on the Korean peninsula.23 
Recent military transformation developments outline some of the specific 
Service-related goals and describe how these objectives fulfill the broader DoD 
transformation requirement to improve overall military capabilities. 
B. ARMY TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS  
The Army may be undergoing the most ambitious transformation of any of the 
services.  It is proceeding along three parallel tracks, developing a long-term objective 
force, a medium-term, interim force, and a legacy force to hedge against the other two 
forces.  The key element to the Army’s long-term approach is a transition to smaller, 
lighter, faster units that rely on technology to replace the M-1 tanks and Bradley vehicles.  
If this approach is not adequate, the Army can still rely on its mid-term approach, which 
focuses on using pre-positioned equipment and Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) 
as a rapid deployment force.24  Over the past decade, the Army has undergone changes 
emanating from three separate visions:  digitization, preservation, and transformation.  
Based on the first two visions, the Army was prepared to fight major theater wars with 
heavy armored divisions, and thus it was less prepared to fight the many small-scale 
contingencies that have emerged globally.  The latest Army vision of transformation 
seeks to create a Future Combat System (FCS) composed of a light to medium-weight 
force that can still respond to a major theater war as necessary, while remaining mobile 
and capable enough to fight the smaller-scale contingencies.  A transformed Army will 
                                                 
22 Esther Schrader, “Budget Concentrates on Modernizing Military,” Los Angeles Times, 31 January 
2004. 
23 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., “U.S. Troops Slated to Move South from Korean DMZ,”  
6 June 2003. 
24 Hans Binnendijk, ed., Transforming America’s Military, (Washington D.C.:  National Defense 
University Press, August 2002). 
9seek to negate anti-access and area denial strategies.  Until this FCS is available, the 
Army will field an interim force consisting of legacy forces and six IBCTs.25  
One of the newly developed technologies gaining attention is the Stryker light 
armored vehicle.  Strykers can reach speeds up to 100 kph, they can be transported by 
plane anywhere in the world within 96 hours, and can operate for three days without 
refueling.26  The Strykers are about half the weight of a tank, yet the Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team (SBCT) possesses significantly more firepower, survivability, and 
mobility than the light infantry brigade.  Two of these Stryker brigades have already been 
assembled.  Coupled with the Army’s new maneuver units of action these systems are 
fully integrated combined-arms organizations that will substantially reduce deployment 
time because they comprise a complete force package that trains and deploys together.  
From a joint perspective, the SBCT provides an air deployable asset that contains 
substantial ground combat capability and complements the Marines’ expeditionary units 
or the Air Force’s expeditionary forces.27 
The FCS is part of an overall Objective Force composed of Units of Action.  It is 
the Army’s full spectrum force, organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be more 
strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable 
across the full spectrum of operations.  Objective Force units conduct operational 
maneuver from strategic distances, conduct forcible entry, overwhelm aggressor anti-
access capabilities, and rapidly impose their will on the enemy.28 
When former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki retired in 2003, he warned 
that the increase in America’s global commitment would require more troops, not less, as 
has been evidenced by the build-up of the forces in Iraq.  Secretary Rumsfeld disagreed 
with  this  assessment  and  insisted that the build-up of forces was temporary and that the  
                                                 
25 Joseph N. Mait, and Jon G. Grossman, “Relevancy and Risks:  The U.S. Army and Future Combat 
Systems,” (Washington D.C.:  Defense Horizons, National Defense University, May 2002). 
26 Hiroko Kono, “Challenge of America/Military Transformation Arms U.S. for Age of Ascendancy,” 
The Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 January 2003. 
27 Eric Peltz, Toward an Expeditionary Army:  New Options for Combatant Commanders, Testimony 
Presented to the House Armed Services Committee, (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 24 March 
2004), 4-6. 
28 Eric K. Shinseki, U.S. Army White Paper:  Concepts for the Objective Force,” (Washington D.C.: 
Headquarters U.S. Army, 2001). 
10
United States would trim down its force structure as part of the military transformation.  
He said, “It was the capability of a force, not its size that should be the critical 
measurement.”29 
Secretary Rumsfeld also indicated that America is only using a relatively small 
percentage of its military forces in deployments across the globe—and these forces are 
continually recycled through deployments.  The problem is not that the United States has 
too few forces; the problem is how America manages the mix of forces at its disposal.   
When nearly 60 percent of the Guard and Reserve forces have not been deployed, the 
overall military has not been stressed; only the other 40 percent has been stressed.  The 
key is to get the best use of all forces or restructure them so that there are more forces 
with the right capabilities.30 
To correct this imbalance in the type of forces, the DoD has already redistributed 
skill sets within the Reserve and active-duty components resulting in rebalancing 10,000 
positions.  By the end of 2004, the DoD projects to have rebalanced 50,000 positions.  In 
addition, the Services are transforming to increase their combat capabilities while 
decreasing the demand on personnel.  To accomplish this feat, the Army is focusing on 
creating modular, self-contained brigades that would be interchangeable with any 
division.  The new “modular army” will not only become more interoperable within the 
Army but with the other services.  Other innovations include, improving force 
management by taking military personnel out of civilian jobs to make them available for 
military tasks; reducing the number of troops and dependents constantly being rotated; 
and fixing the mobilization process to make it more flexible for troops and families.31 
As part of the transformation process, the Army recently announced that it would 
encourage “homesteading” for its personnel.  The nomadic lifestyle of persistent 
deployments will become a practice of the past.  Keeping troops and their families 
together for six or seven years at the same location will improve the unit cohesiveness the 
Army is trying to develop within its new “modular army.”  By training personnel 
together, sending them to fight together, and returning them home together, the Army can 
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develop a more effective combat team.  In addition to this mission benefit, decreased 
deployments will also strengthen family ties for personnel.32 
To lead the way in building the “modular army,” Secretary Rumsfeld handpicked 
the once retired SOF commander General Peter Schoomaker.  The new Army Chief of 
Staff is restructuring the 10-division Army from 33 to 48 combat brigades.  These 
brigades will be maneuver units of action that are already back-fitted with support 
personnel to reduce deployment time.  The battlefield laboratory is the 3rd Infantry 
Division, which has been reorganized into five maneuver units of action—it is projected 
for fielding in Iraq in 2005.33  When speaking about transformation, General Schoomaker 
revealed an openness and feisty innovativeness to “think outside the box”. 
As far as I’m concerned, there is not a damn thing sacred about what we 
are doing in the Army except our values…I’m often asked, how far can I 
move the Army?  I tell them as far as I can.  The Army is tremendously 
resilient.  You can’t fool around on the margins if we’re going to change.  
We’re going to move very quickly.34 
The recent cancellation of major weapons systems programs has demonstrated 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s strict adherence to his transformational goals.  With the advent and 
profusion of precision-guided munitions, Rumsfeld decided that the Army no longer 
required the world’s most sophisticated howitzer so he canceled the Crusader.  Lessons 
learned from operations in Iraq demonstrated the vulnerability for low-flying helicopters, 
so he canceled the Comanche program.  The outcome of the Air Force’s F/A-22 fighter, 
the Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey, and the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship are also 
undergoing heavy scrutiny to ensure these systems will complement the military of the 
future.35 
C. AIR FORCE TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS  
The Air Force’s Vision 2020 calls for assuring security and stability in the world 
through global vigilance, to anticipate and deter threats with strategic reach, to prevent 
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crises and to attain overwhelming power to prevail in conflicts and wars.  To achieve this 
vision, the Air Force has constituted 10 deployable Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) that 
provide commanders with flexible and effects-based aerospace packages to respond to 
any contingency worldwide.  In addition, the Air Force maintains an Air Expeditionary 
Wing that can respond to emergencies such as the 9/11 terrorists attacks.  The rotational 
structure of the AEF allows two forces to be constantly deployed or on-call, providing 
predictability and stability to personnel.  The Air Force can deploy up to five AEFs 
simultaneously within 15 days to conduct wars.36 
Two separate military technologies offered an order-of-magnitude breakthrough 
in transforming the Air Force.  The first was low-observable, stealth technology and the 
second was precision-guided munitions.  Together these two capabilities, in connection 
with effects-based planning, allowed U.S. forces to execute parallel warfare.  Parallel 
warfare provides simultaneous application of force across the breadth and depth of the 
battlefield.  The joint force commander, regardless of service affiliation can use 
aerospace power in an integrated way to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical 
success.  The past decade has proven that aerospace power’s inherent speed, range, and 
flexibility allowed it to make the transformational leap from the Cold War to the demands 
of the contemporary world.37 
Regardless of the nature or location of the crises, aerospace power has played a 
significant role.  From 1990 to 1997 alone, the Air Force has been engaged in 45 small-
scale contingencies—an average of one per every nine weeks, as compared to 16 during 
the entire Cold War period.  This record portends the type of warfare the United States 
can expect in the future and provides the basis for the Global Strike Task Force (GSTF).  
GSTF allows the United States to overcome range barriers by providing the means to 
rapidly push back threats.  GSTF rapidly establishes air superiority and guarantees that 
joint forces enjoy freedom from attack and freedom to attack.  GSTF is a rapid-reaction 
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force with leading-edge power-projection capabilities employed within the AEF while 
maintaining interoperability with joint or coalition forces.38 
Air Force leaders have recently stated their commitment to support ground troops.  
The Air Force appears to be implementing the best lessons learned in Afghanistan and 
making a concerted effort to integrate its transformation efforts into the joint realm.39  
The Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper believes that generations of Army 
officers often saw aircraft fly overhead, but never knew how they supported Army 
operations.  To correct this deficiency, General Jumper vowed that the Air Force and the 
Army would exercise together to ensure Army leaders understood how air and space 
power could benefit them.40 
To support this jointness, the Air Force recently decided to purchase the Marines’ 
short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing (STOVL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter.  The 
STOVL will help support ground forces since it will be able to access smaller landing 
sites closer to the ground fighting.  In addition, the stalwart ground-support aircraft, the 
A-10, will be modernized with stronger engines, new avionics, better data links, and 
improved precision weapons capability to enhance its support of the ground troops.  
Furthermore, through its “Battlefield Airman” project, the Air Force has enhanced the 
ground controller’s integration with airpower by reducing the weight of equipment 
packages by 50 percent, improving communications links that reduce connection times 
by 40 percent and designing data links that pinpoint targets up to 10 kilometers away.41 
Even as the Air Force awaits final development of F-22 and F-35 aircraft, it is 
modernizing its existing fleet of F-16s and F-15Es with new radars and converting some 
F-15Cs  into  strike  versions  to  support  ground operations.  Secretary Roche stated this  
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“focused investment, these new approaches and newer ways of thinking will enable us to 
produce a set of capabilities that will expand our Air Force portfolio of military 
advantages.”42 
D. NAVY TRANSFORMATION DEVELOPMENTS  
In many ways, the Navy has changed in more fundamental ways than the Army.  
The Navy has moved away from focusing on control of the high seas to gaining the 
advantage in the littoral areas and in gaining access to inland areas.  Virtually every ship 
in the Navy can support aircraft operations.  The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is intended 
to support the Navy’s new focus on securing and exploiting the littoral areas.  The LCS 
would complement existing littoral capabilities and would exploit maturing networks, 
off-board systems, and advances in platform technology.  With shallow draft, fast 
transport ships, the LCS will be able to move forces into contested littoral areas more 
rapidly and will be less dependent on traditional ports.43 
Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and 
dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, 
defensive assurance, and operational independence.  Sea Power 21 is the Navy’s vision 
and it includes the following concepts:  Sea Strike, projecting precise and persistent 
offensive power; Sea Shield, projecting global defensive assurance; and Sea Basing, 
projecting joint operational independence.  These strategies will be facilitated by a Force-
Net, which is an overarching effort to integrate people, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a combat network.  The Global Concept of 
Operations will disperse combat striking power by creating additional independent 
operational groups capable of responding simultaneously around the globe.  The 
operational groups include 12 Carrier Strike Groups, 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups, 
and multiple missile-defense Surface Action Groups and guided missile submarines.44 
Sea Basing is critical to Sea Power 21.  It places capabilities at sea that are 
essential to operational success of joint and coalition missions.  By doing so, it reduces                                                  
42 Quoted in Elaine M. Grossman, “Air Force Unveils Fresh Commitment to Supporting Ground 
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the need to build up forces and supplies ashore, minimizes their vulnerability, and 
enhances operational mobility.  The traditional shortcomings of sea-based forces 
including reach and connectivity have largely been overcome by new technologies and 
concepts of operations, making the traditional advantages of sea-based forces including 
independence, mobility, and security more accessible.45  
The Sea Base is comprised of the integrated carrier and expeditionary strike 
groups, support ships, maritime pre-positioning ships, and high-speed support vessels.  
Keeping the arsenals of U.S. firepower within the theater decreases deployment and 
employment timelines and provides commanders with greater operational responsiveness.  
A theater presence and operational freedom are vital to deterring and defeating threats.  
Rotating crew strategies will optimize manning and provide an enduring on-scene 
presence.46 
In the summer of 2004, the Navy successfully demonstrated responsive, credible 
combat power across the globe by simultaneously deploying seven Carrier Support 
Groups (CSGs) in five separate theaters.  The exercise called “Summer Pulse ‘04’ 
demonstrated the Navy’s first attempt to exercise its new operational strategy, the Fleet 
Response Plan (FRP).  Within the FRP strategy, the Navy can deploy six CSGs in less 
than 30 days to respond to a crisis anywhere on the globe, and it should be able to deploy 
two more CSGs within three months to reinforce the initial forces or to support another 
crisis elsewhere.  The plan departs from traditional six-month deployments of CSGs and 
steers toward a force that is more flexible and prepared to simultaneously respond 
whenever and wherever it is called upon.47 
E. MARINE CORPS TRANSFORMATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS  
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the foundation upon which the 
Marines will fight in the uncertain security environment of the future.  EMW combines 
the best of the Marines’ heritage in maneuver and expeditionary warfare.  The Marines 
possess a strategic agility, the capability to deploy to distant theaters; an operational 
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reach, the capability to conduct effective operations through the depth of the battle space; 
and tactical flexibility, the capability to conduct concurrent, dissimilar missions.  The 
Marines will operate from a sea-basing concept, using the littorals to influence events, 
and using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure base from which to project power.  
The Marines will fight from flexible teams known as Marine Air Ground Task Forces.  
They will combat major wars using Expeditionary Forces; they will fight small-scale 
contingencies using Expeditionary Brigades; and they will promote peace and stability 
with Expeditionary Units.48 
Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM) is the execution of combined-arms 
maneuver from the littoral battlespace directly to inland objectives.  STOM’s objective is 
to project combat units ashore and to sustain them until mission accomplishment.  The 
force disposition is based on the Marine Expeditionary Brigade.  Previous logistics 
support for amphibious operations required a build-up of beach support areas, fuel farms, 
ammo storage, and supply centers.  With the sea base providing the conduit for moving 
supplies, personnel and equipment ashore, the requirement for shore-based support is 
minimized.  The maritime pre-positioning force allows a commander to rapidly create a 
comprehensive combat capability afloat in theater with minimum reliance on availability 
of access ashore.49 
Transformation efforts throughout the military services share the common goals 
expressed by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Vision 2020.  As described, the 
transformation efforts within the services also share the common characteristics of 
creating more mobile, flexible, and lethal capabilities that are geared towards self reliance 
and self sustainment; yet these forces are integrated with each other as well as friends and 
allies to accomplish objectives. 
The introduction and demonstration of varied transformational initiatives has the 
eventual and natural side-effect of influencing how the military force is structured and 
positioned around the globe.   The  way forces are structured and positioned also depends  
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on the military capabilities demonstrated and results achieved.  The next chapter 
evaluates U.S. military capability in terms of its demonstrated actions in various conflicts 
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III. U.S. MILITARY CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND 
KOSOVO 
The major U.S.-led conflicts since the end of the Cold War reflect similar themes 
in terms of the keys to their success.  The United States built coalitions, gaining the 
necessary access into the regions of interests and providing legitimacy for its cause; and 
America demonstrated overmatching military capability based on technological prowess, 
precision weapons, joint integration, and strategic logistics, including pre-positioned 
materiel in the region. 
A. COALITIONS/ACCESS  
The building of coalitions of nations in each of these conflicts demonstrated a 
U.S. commitment to multinational efforts and confirmed America’s reliance on other 
nations for access and support in remote regions. 
1. Afghanistan 
While peacekeeping efforts are ongoing, the United States and its allies were able 
to destroy Taliban forces and remove the enemy from power in Afghanistan in a mere 49 
days.  This is significant because the original military estimate for success was thought to 
be six months.  This remarkable feat was achievable only when the United States rallied a 
coalition of nations to fight the Taliban in less than three weeks after the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attack in the United States. 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan demonstrated that it is difficult to 
rapidly deploy forces into a distant theater without standing operations orders, assured 
access to regional airfields/airspace, and the supporting infrastructure.  Following the 
September 11 attacks on the United States, it took planners nearly three weeks to forge 
alliances, prepare plans against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and put in place the overflight, 
basing, and special-access agreements essential for Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Ramstein Air Base, Germany served as the principal strategic hub for all airlift operations 
supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.  Armenia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
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Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan granted overflight privileges.  Bulgaria 
also allowed the U.S. military use of a Black Sea base for KC-135 tanker operations.50 
In accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, an attack on any one signatory 
is taken as an attack on all.  The United States invoked this article and the NATO 
governments agreed.  The British contributed Special Forces units, warships, and aircraft 
flying out of Oman, including an AWACS aircraft.  Most other nations provided 
peacekeeping forces after the new government had been installed at Kabul.  The Russians 
and Chinese also supported the war on terrorism.  Russia helped arm the Northern 
Alliance.51 
In preparation for the war in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM and the USAF 
completed site surveys of many Central Asian airfields, entered agreements with three of 
the countries, and negotiated limited use of airfields in the other two.52  Uzbekistan was 
the first country to offer access rights to U.S. military forces for operations in 
Afghanistan.  It offered Khanabad for all but offensive combat operations, serving as a 
logistics hub in support of ground forces in Afghanistan, search and rescue operations, 
and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launch and recovery.  In exchange for use of 
airfields, the United States signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on 12 March 2002 for 
future cooperation and security arrangements.53 
In December 2001, America signed a one-year lease/access agreement with 
Kyrgyzstan for use of Manas International Airport near the capital of Bishkek.  The U.S. 
military built a 37-acre base extension to the airport with an administration headquarters, 
housing, warehouses, munitions bunkers, fuel tanks, etc.  It was clearly the best 
operational base that U.S. forces had for direct access into the region.  This facility 
supported a variety of missions and was a strategic logistics, refueling, and operational 
hub for air forces supporting operations over Afghanistan.  It was used to transport troops 
and cargo to bases in the Afghan cities of Kandahar, Bagram, and Mazar-i-Sharif; stage 
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tactical fighter operations over Afghanistan; and launch unmanned UAVs.  Unlike the 
agreements with other nations, the agreement with Kyrgyzstan did not limit the type of 
aircraft or missions that allies could perform from Manas.  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
both provided critical overflight rights and limited access to their airfields.  It cannot be 
overemphasized that these countries provided critical staging bases on the perimeter of 
Afghanistan that allowed America to more effectively and efficiently move assets into the 
combat zone54 
In December 2001, Tajikistan offered the United States use of former Soviet air 
bases.  The United States identified one as suitable for staging fighter-bombers, search 
and rescue aircraft, helicopters, and as a transportation hub for supplies, equipment and 
personnel into Afghanistan.  In early 2002, U.S. forces deployed to Kulyab airbase, from 
which they conducted logistics support, search and rescue, troop deployment, and air 
operations.  Allied French and Italian forces also deployed from this base.55 
Pakistani or Saudi Arabian assistance was limited and low-key because both had 
been outside supporters of the Taliban.  Pakistan military intelligence had placed the 
Taliban regime in power and much of the Al Qaeda network’s financing came from Saudi 
Arabia.  Pakistan provided direct air and ground access as well as intelligence 
information on the Taliban forces.  President Musharraf of Pakistan found the war very 
useful in helping combat the fundamentalists who had been trying to overtake the 
Pakistan government.  Saudi Arabia did not want any new American forces in its country; 
however it did allow the use of its American-built air operations center.  The less visible 
the American presence, the more acceptable it was.  Support aircraft were more 
acceptable than combat aircraft and the Saudis refused to allow combat operations from 
its soil.56 
Since Afghanistan was landlocked and combat operations from Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan were not allowed, the United States had to develop a coalition with the 
willing Afghans.  A secret agreement was reached with Uzbekistan to move U.S. troops 
into the country to secure bases to airlift supplies to the Northern Alliance.  America 
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needed external coalition partners for two key reasons.  One was operational--the United 
States needed intelligence on the Taliban and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia had information.  
The other reason was that the United States required access to airspace and bases.57 
Other gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman did welcome U.S. and 
British aircraft.  The United States government made it clear that it would be fighting the 
Taliban government and not the Afghan people.  Based on Afghanistan’s history of 
expelling occupation forces, this was a good thing because America did not intend to 
occupy the country and it wanted to avoid the perception that this was a war against 
Muslims.58 
By mid-October 2001, 44 countries had provided overflight permission and 33 
had provided landing rights.  In addition, 36 offered military forces or equipment for 
raids against the Taliban, and 14 had accepted U.S. forces on their territory.  Special 
Forces were deployed to Afghanistan by Britain, Australia, and Canada.  All these 
countries were helpful in the cause against the Taliban; however, none were absolutely 
essential in that they did not hold veto power over American action.  This was a key 
because countries may have felt pressured to veto American activity based on 
Muslim/Arab ties.  As it turned out, American sea power provided mobile bases near 
Afghanistan in international waters, and the United States conducted the initial phase of 
the war prior to completing assembly of the coalition.  Since the United States 
demonstrated it would conduct the war on its own if necessary, it freed many countries 
into feeling less pressure to join the cause.59 
2. Iraq:  Desert Shield/Storm 
Although the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated America’s preeminent military power, 
it also confirmed the importance of building and maintaining coalitions of nations and the 
United States’ dependence on its allies for assistance and legitimacy.  The U.S.-led 
coalition not only provided political legitimacy, it fostered economic, military, and 
logistical support.60  Providing some of the most critical support from outside the region 
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were countries such as Great Britain, Spain, Germany, France, Australia, Turkey, and 
Japan.  From within the region it was crucial to have the support of as many Arab nations 
as possible including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and even Syria to a limited extent.61 
The alliances created by the United States provided access for the deployment of 
forces and the prosecution of the war.  Access to Saudi Arabia ports and airfields was 
critical to the successful deployment of allied forces into the gulf region.  Without this 
access, the United States would have had to rely on unsecured Kuwaiti facilities or 
depend on launching aircraft and missiles from other locations including U.S. ships.62 
The staging bases located in Torrejon, Spain and Rhein Main, Germany were 
crucial to airlift support within the region.  The deployments would have been more 
difficult and taken much longer without these enroute bases.  It was not just a matter of 
having runways but it was also important to have the infrastructure, ramp space, storage 
facilities, refueling capability, cargo handling equipment, and personnel support 
facilities.63 
3. Iraq:  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the continuing importance of regional 
friends and allies.  The United States acquired sustained open support from the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and it also received 
quiet support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan despite the growing tensions between the 
Arab world and the United States.  Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to over-fly its 
territory with aircraft and missiles and broadened the use of its bases to increase support 
of the no-fly zones.  Although it did not allow combat operations from its soil, Saudi 
Arabia did authorize command and control and surveillance missions and operations 
from its territory, and it allowed the use of its facilities for search and rescue missions.  
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Egypt allowed transit through its airspace and the Suez Canal.  Jordan allowed U.S. over-
flight of its territory and authorized Patriot missile batteries to operate from its soil.64 
There were some problems with obtaining basing and overflight rights for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The hesitation and reluctance on the part of some allies 
demanded greater flexibility and adaptation in the planning and deployment processes.  
When the ability to leverage access and overflight rights constantly changed, the system 
needed to be flexible enough to adapt.65 
4. Kosovo 
Again the importance of coalitions is a prevalent theme throughout this conflict.  
The United States could not have conducted Operation Allied Force unilaterally.  NATO 
allies provided personnel, logistics, bases, overflight permission, host-nation force 
contributions including aircraft, and political and diplomatic support.  Some of the most 
significant contributions in the region came from Hungary, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Albania.66  General Wesley Clark, Commander of Operation Allied Force 
also believed that consensus among the 19 NATO nations was required to approve action 
and that the fundamental lesson of the campaign was that this alliance system was 
successful.67 
B. MILITARY CAPABILITIES  
The U.S. military conflicts since the Cold War have confirmed that the DoD is not 
only on the right tract regarding transformation efforts but also that the military success 
demonstrated unrivaled capabilities and inspired more aggressive transformational 
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1. Afghanistan 
Some analysts thought that America could not drop enough weapons tonnage to 
defeat the Taliban because it did not possess bases in the area.  In September 2001, a 
Russian  commentator  remarked  that  the  United   States would find war in Afghanistan  
difficult because it had no nearby bases.  The commentator omitted the floating bases 
operated by the U.S. Navy, from which about 75 percent of combat sorties over 
Afghanistan were launched.68 
This was the first time in history that a government had relied on its fleet to strike 
a land-locked country more than 350 miles from the sea and separated from the sea by a 
third state (in this case, Pakistan).  The Afghan war was largely a maritime-based war.  
The Marines came from the sea, Tomahawks were fired from destroyers, and submarines 
operated in the Gulf of Oman.  With sufficient refueling, the range of carrier aircraft 
could match the cruise missiles.  The United States could move these floating carrier 
bases at will.  The majority of tactical air power was delivered from the carriers since the 
only permanent air base in the region at the beginning of hostilities was located at 
Oman.69 
The war involved three strike aircraft carriers--the Enterprise, Carl Vinson, and 
Theodore Roosevelt.  The carrier John C. Stennis was also sent to the area in November 
2001.  There were also two amphibious ready groups and the large amphibious ships, 
Bataan and Pelelieu, carrying Marine Expeditionary Units that would play the principle 
ground forces role in southern Afghanistan.  Army helicopters based in Uzbekistan 
covered the northern part of the country.70  In the Afghanistan campaign, America used 
one of its carriers, the Kitty Hawk as an afloat forward staging base (AFSB) for Special 
Forces, including more than 1,000 personnel from the Navy SEALS, U.S. Army and 
USAF special operations units, and Green Berets.  Rotary assets including the MH-60 
Blackhawk, MH-47 Chinook, and MH-53 Pave Low were also available from the carrier.  
This flexibility allowed better command and control of Special Forces operations, 
provided joint basing and command facilities, and allowed for better management of 
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helicopter assets.71  The use of carriers as AFSBs is an evolution in the role of carriers in 
military operations and represents the military’s desire to increase American power 
projection and strike capability across the globe.72 
Aircraft range is of limited importance when forward basing is available; 
however, at the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan, the United States could not 
deploy combat aircraft into bases in Central Asia and Pakistan, although it did acquire 
this capability over time.  The lack of forward basing limited the use of shorter range 
aircraft; however, F-18s, F-14s, and other fighters relied on air refueling for extended 
missions from the carriers.  The successful carrier operations were highly dependent on 
USAF refueling assets based in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman.73 
Since America had no operating bases or strong allies guaranteeing access rights 
near Afghanistan, the most efficient and effective way to support operations, as 
demonstrated in Bosnia and Kosovo was to establish at least one regional staging base.  
During Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force staged about 12 KC-10/135 tankers 
out of Burgas air base, Bulgaria, to refuel air-lifters over the Black Sea.74  America relied 
heavily on strategic airlift to transport forces and equipment to forward staging areas and 
the battlefield.  Of the 5,500 missions in Afghanistan, the USAF estimated that the C-17 
was involved in 2,872.  The Air Force is using these figures as part of the justification to 
purchase 60 new C-17s.75 
During the early weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom, American and allied 
combat air operations were restricted to long-range bombers and carrier-based aircraft.  
The U.S. Navy generated about 90 percent of the sorties during the initial weeks of 
combat.  The Air Force prefers to operate their larger airlift and tanker aircraft from long, 
well-reinforced runways, usually 8,000 to 10,000 feet.  The emphasis is on preference 
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because the Air Force is prepared and has operated from airfields that fall far short of the 
preferred standard.  During Operation Enduring Freedom, the Air Force improvised due 
to lack of access to larger airfields by having them fly racetrack orbits along the en-route 
flight paths.  This option was less than optimal because it increased the sortie rate for the 
tankers.  The Air Force was prepared to overcome shortfalls by bringing in fuel bladders, 
mobile navigation and control systems, tents, and life support systems.  Additionally both 
the Air Force and the Army employed American contractors to provide specific support 
using local labor and materials.76 
In the Central Asian airfields, the Air Force deployed a Tanker Airlift Control 
Element (TALCE) to establish or upgrade existing command and control, navigation, 
maintenance, and logistic support operations.  Air Force engineers also deployed early to 
improve airfield operations and provide life-support facilities for troops on the ground.  
The Air Force has prepackaged, transportable bare base kits that contain everything from 
tents to latrines to support a thousand troops.  The Central Asian airfields served as 
forward support locations (FSLs) for U.S. forces operating in the region.  FSLs are 
regional support facilities outside CONUS, located at sites with high assurance of access.  
They can be upgraded and stocked to support the rapid deployment of forces into the 
region, and can be maintained with only a minimal or temporary U.S. military presence.77 
Diego Garcia housed eight B-1B and ten B-52 bombers.  These aircraft flew on 
average, one mission every other day, or a total of four B-1 and five B-52 missions per 
day.  The new GPS technology allowed these heavy bombers to drop precision guided 
munitions.  Overall, naval aircraft flew about 75 percent of all sorties and dropped about 
30 percent of the munitions while the AF flew about 25 percent of the combat sorties and 
dropped about 70 percent of the munitions.78 
The use of air power was a principle factor in the speedy collapse of the Taliban.  
In the initial phase, American bombers and carrier-based aircraft destroyed Taliban air 
defenses, communications, and military installations.  It was not until the fourth week of 
the offensive that air power shifted to support of ground troops.  Special Forces on the 
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ground helped identify targets for the aircraft.  In many cases the response time was less 
than 20 minutes from the moment a target was spotted to its destruction.79 
The shift toward precision munitions since the end of the Cold War has been 
demonstrated by the estimate that 10,000 of the 18,000, or 60 percent of the U.S. air 
weapons used in Afghanistan were precision guided.  This compares to 35 percent used 
in the Kosovo campaign and 10 percent used in Iraq for Desert Storm.  B-52s and B-1s 
flew 10 percent of the missions but delivered 65 percent of the munitions and bombers 
dropped half of the guided munitions.80  
In the past, U.S. forces had to rely on laser-guided bombs.  The pilot not only had 
to visually locate the target, the target had to be distinctive from its surroundings.  Many 
targets were difficult to locate or to distinguish from the environment.  The new precision 
weapons, namely Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), flew to preset coordinates 
based on satellite navigation.  The JDAM meant that forward controllers had a different 
set of requirements.  The controller only needed a set of target coordinates and a hand-
held GPS receiver to provide the coordinates.  A laptop computer and a modem were 
used to transmit the results to an orbiting bomber.  The equivalent laser designator was 
heavy and relatively more difficult to operate.81  Another benefit of JDAMs was that a 
heavy bomber could use them to engage multiple targets and in quick succession; thus the 
strategic bomber force could also be used as a powerful tactical weapon.82 
Another key to success in Afghanistan was the close interaction of fire and 
maneuver—neither of which was sufficient by itself, and neither of which could have 
succeeded without forces on the ground.83  In cooperation with trained spotters on the 
ground, airpower demonstrated a level of flexibility, accuracy, and power exceeding any 
previous  war.   Surveillance  assets  could  not  detect  all  enemy positions and precision  
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weapons could not annihilate the most heavily concealed, dug-in positions.  It was the 
combination of the combat ground forces, all-weather fires and air support that made the 
difference.84 
U.S. forces faced operational challenges in Afghanistan with regard to terrain.  
They effectively used helicopters to provide high-speed mobility, and responsive and 
precise airborne fire support to provide long-range engagement capability as well as close 
air support.  The combination of precision-guided munitions and good target 
designation/identification from the ground proved to be a deadly combination that made 
it possible to effectively use high-flying bombers for close support missions.85 
Controllers made flexible air operations practical, as aircraft could orbit over 
Afghanistan until they were assigned a particular controller.  Some controllers even rode 
on horses to traverse the mountainous terrain.  One report credited the controllers with 
winning the battle for Kabul in 25 days rather than the six months predicted by war 
planners.86  Air attacks were called in and controlled by Special Forces personnel, 
including Air Force tactical air controllers.  Not all targets were found by Special Forces 
on the ground.  In many cases reconnaissance aircraft were cued by electronic 
intelligence aircraft such as the EP-3E and the RC-135.87 
The United States demonstrated much better joint capabilities in warfighting than 
it had in previous campaigns.  According to USAF Brig. Gen. James Smith, in a 
traditional scenario, the military in Afghanistan would have had the Marines on the coast, 
the Army in another sector, and the Air Force in another.  Lines on a map would divide 
them.  They would not talk to each other, so you had to stay on your own side of the line.  
There were no lines in Afghanistan.  Military officials developed a technical bridge 
between two systems.  The joint forces commander had the new ability to integrate 
ground forces with air forces.88  
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One of the most incredible aspects of the war was the speed with which it was 
begun and then fought.  The new type of warfare that made it possible to fight using very 
limited forces increased that speed.89  Some U.S. officials cautioned that it would take 
over six months to break the Taliban’s five-year hold on power; it took 49 days.  The 
sensor-to-shooter loop which indicates the time it takes to obtain, process, and relay 
target information was tightened from days to hours, and then to minutes.90 
The sensor-to-shooter process relied on surveillance sensors including thermal 
images, Predator reconnaissance drones, and satellites to locate the enemy.  With this 
network of intelligence and surveillance, U.S. ground forces held the enemy in place 
from a distance and bombs or artillery, not infantrymen, were often used to finish off the 
foe.91 
In Afghanistan, for the first time, America was able to provide around-the-clock 
airborne surveillance.  Virtually any ground movement could be detected and dealt with.  
This allowed U.S. forces to attack a target within minutes of identifying it and led to real 
time targeting.  Navy pilots reported that in 80 percent of their missions they did not 
know their intended target when they left the carrier.  Command and reconnaissance 
aircraft were linked so that real time intelligence could be used for targeting purposes.92 
2. Iraq:  Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  Five days later, the United States began 
its initial deployment of military forces to Saudi Arabia.  Phase I of the military 
deployment, Desert Shield, was implemented as a defensive maneuver to deter Iraqi 
forces from overtaking Saudi Arabia.  It marked the greatest buildup of combat power 
across the greatest distances in history; the deployment of forces and equipment was 
several times larger than the amounts deployed during Vietnam and Korea during a 
comparable time frame.93  It took nearly six weeks to deploy the first heavy armored 
division and roughly three months before equipment, supplies, and troops adequate to 
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defend Saudi Arabia were in place.  The absence of further Iraqi aggression provided the 
United States and its allies the luxury of time to position the necessary troops and 
equipment in the theater.94  Three months into the buildup of forces, President Bush 
decided to change U.S. objectives from merely defending Saudi Arabia to an offensive 
strategy of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  Nine weeks from the beginning of 
deploying offensive forces into Saudi Arabia, the United States was ready for Phase II of 
the operations, Desert Storm.95 
The United States was well prepared for its foray into the Iraq in 1990; however, 
the previous Cold War military structure and force positioning strategy did not lend 
themselves to easily support logistics for various regional contingencies around the globe.  
President Bush’s new “global stability” strategy called for a more mobile crisis response 
capability which promoted influence and access around the world.  To reduce 
deployment time, the United States developed pre-positioning ships that could store 
strategic war materiel at sea in specific regions of interest.  In addition, despite the fact 
that the Middle East countries kept the U.S. military forces at arms length and prevented 
them from establishing permanent bases in the region, some of these countries did allow 
temporary deployments and military exercises in the region.  These exercises helped the 
United States get its foot in the door in the Middle East and proved to be part of the 
success story in Iraq because it allowed America to attain a military presence and 
capability in the region, even if only temporary and on a small scale.96 
Strategic sealift provided a solid base for Desert Shield/Strom deployments.  The 
Navy had 11 Afloat Pre-positioned ships.  These ships, including one hospital ship, 
carried ordnance, fuel and supplies for the Army and the Air Force.  The Army used four 
of these pre-positioned ships at Diego Garcia.  The Marines used assets from its 13 
maritime pre-positioned ships forming three squadrons based in Guam, Diego Garcia, 
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and the Atlantic.  These ships carried equipment and 30 days of supplies for three Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades.  The Navy also possessed eight Fast Sealift Ships capable of 30 
knots speed for rapid deployment of Army equipment and supplies.  The Ready Reserve 
Force consisted of 96 ships, mostly of the roll-on/roll-off variety to allow rapid loading 
and unloading of equipment and supplies.  Most of the ship-borne assets were processed 
through the Ad Dammam and Al Jubail seaports in Saudi Arabia.97 
The Air Force had 30 percent of its pre-positioned assets at air bases in the 
Middle East, including Oman, Thumrait, Masirah, and Bahrain, and 52 percent stored in 
pre-arranged sets of supplies in the CONUS.  Most airborne assets were offloaded at 
Dhahran airport.  The Air Force primarily used four enroute staging bases to deliver 
equipment and supplies to the Middle East.  Zaragoza and Torrejon Spain, and Rhein-
Main and Ramstein Germany handled 75 percent of the airflow for deployments.98 
As important as technology, airpower, stealth, and precision weapons were to this 
new way of war, the American strategic transportation system was just as critical to the 
success of the war in Iraq.  The United States was able to strategically move a defensive 
force halfway around the world in twelve weeks; strategically move an offensive force, 
double the size of the defensive force, to the Gulf in another nine weeks; and strategically 
transport two Corps in theater for a surprise envelopment of the Iraqi forces.  American 
strategic forces demonstrated the ability to reach anywhere on the globe.  America further 
demonstrated it could deploy air forces and light ground forces around the world in a 
matter of days.99 
The war against Iraq was without precedent in military history.  It was the dawn 
of a new age in which technology overshadowed conventional war-making, a war in 
which the allied side had a clear picture of unfolding events while the Iraqis remained in 
the fog.  It was a war in which a new breed of highly specialized and proficient warriors 
outmatched the traditional soldiers, and it was the first war in history in which airpower, 
not ground forces, was the deciding element.  In the end, a million-man army was                                                  
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devastated and its equipment and facilities were laid to waste as easily as target practice.  
This was new way of war demonstrated how technology and asymmetric capabilities 
ruled the day and it would portend the wars of the future.100 
3. Iraq:  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The transformational character of Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly stood out when 
contrasting the U.S.-led forces with the Iraqi military.  The speed and scale of the 
successful military operations spoke volumes about the differences in capabilities 
between the two forces.  From 19 March 2002, when Special Operations Forces entered 
Iraq to 14 April 2002, when major military operations ceased, the U.S.-led forces swept 
through Iraq with speed and efficiency, clearing the way for profound change in the 
country.  The coalition forces obviously did not require the traditional gauge of military 
power to achieve victory.  Given traditional war planning strategies, the United States 
would have needed five to seven heavy divisions to defeat the Iraqi military, not the one 
American Army mechanized division, the one Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, the 
one light British armored division, and the one light Air Mobile Division.101 
In terms of capability, the Iraqi Army was no match for the superior forces led by 
the United States.  The United States was able to combine air and land operations and 
support them from the sea in concert with joint and coalition forces to defeat the enemy.  
Secretary Rumsfeld summarized the key lessons learned during operation Iraqi Freedom 
as overmatching the opponent. 
“Overmatching power” is more important than “overwhelming force.”  In 
the past, under the doctrine of overwhelming force, force tended to be 
measured in  terms of mass—the number of troops that were committed to 
a particular conflict.  In the 21st century, mass may no longer be the best 
measure of power in a conflict.  After all, when Baghdad fell, there were 
just over 100,000 American forces on the ground.  General Franks 
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overwhelmed the enemy not with the typical three to one advantage in 
mass, but by overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and 
using those capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.102 
In terms of pre-positioned equipment and supplies, the United States was able to 
move about a quarter of the amount of war materiel transported during Desert 
Shield/Storm with less transportation capacity in about three months.  For Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, it took the United States only three months to build the same combat capability 
that took seven months to build in the first Iraq War.103 
4. Kosovo Conflict 
On 24 March 1999, the United States and its NATO allies shifted from a 
diplomatic path to a strategy backed by the threat and use of force supported by 
diplomacy.  The United States and its NATO allies forced Milosevic to withdraw from 
Kosovo, degraded his military capabilities, and rescued and resettled over one million 
refugees.  The coalition accomplished its goals through the most precise and lowest-
collateral-damage air campaign in history as reflected by the zero American or allied 
combat casualties in over two months of combat operations, including over 38,000 air 
sorties.104 
In preparation for the Kosovo campaign, the United States augmented its 
European forces with forces from around the world.  It even repositioned forces and 
placed others on alert-response postures to ensure potential threats from North Korea and 
Iraq did not increase.  Stocks of preferred precision weapons were pre-positioned within 
the theater to improve the logistics flow and to save time.  Strategic airlift was preferred 
over sea lift due to the commander’s requirement to have materiel deployed as soon as 
possible.  As there were not enough bases in the local area to accommodate all the force 
capabilities required, strike aircraft were deployed in close proximity to Kosovo while 
tanker and airlift aircraft were positioned at longer-range airfields.105 
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Similar to the war in Afghanistan, there was no traditional clash of massed 
military forces in Operation Allied Force.  The use of air strikes and precision guided  
munitions against strategic, military-industrial infrastructure, and national command and 
control targets as well as attacks against ground forces and equipment caused Milosevic 
to surrender.106 
C. MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED  
In less than two months, the United States destroyed a most repressive regime in 
Afghanistan.  America fought without convenient bases or ports, 7,000 miles away – and 
against a landlocked, mountainous and unfamiliar land.  The Army demonstrated 
proficiency at closing in on and destroying the enemy, coordinating precision fires and 
maneuver, maintaining information superiority, commanding and controlling joint and 
multinational forces, defending land and people, and conducting sustainment 
operations.107  In similar short periods of time, U.S. military forces routed Iraqi forces 
and dispelled them from Kuwait in 1991, U.S. forces deposed the tyrannical Iraqi regime 
in 2003, and overthrew Milosevic from Kosovo in 1999. 
The Afghan War demonstrated the need to be able to rapidly project land and 
airpower at very long distances.  It demonstrated the value of strategic airlift and long-
range strike capability, and the ability to operate with limited forward basing.  It also 
confirmed the value of Special Forces for counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare.108 
This war was far different from the war to liberate Kuwait.  The five-month build-
up to Desert Shield and Desert Storm relied on the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists 
(TPFDLs) and detailed plans.  There were only 12 Requests for Forces (RFFS) during the 
Persian Gulf War while there were over 160 for the Afghanistan War, reflecting the 
constantly changing nature of the conflict.  Augmentees and reinforcements came from 
various commands around the world.109 
Compared to the Kosovo War, forces engaged in Enduring Freedom used 
preexisting command structures from Central Command.  Command relations were clear                                                   
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from the beginning and the structure did not have to be built for this specific operation.  
The solution was the permanent Joint Task Forces that were assigned to operations on an 
‘as required’ basis.110   
The Afghan War was both a test and a demonstration of an emerging new style of 
warfare, or a Revolution in Military Affairs.  It was characterized by remote sensors used 
to allow commanders to attack targets which the attackers often cannot directly see.  It 
emphasized quick operations to upset an enemy’s timetable and to destroy his will to 
fight.  When the ground force element was added to the employment of precision 
weaponry, the strategy proved very successful.  Without the Northern Alliance and the 
Special Forces guiding the weapons to many unseen targets, success would not have been 
achieved.111 
With the success of the Afghan, Iraqi, and Kosovo models, it would make sense 
to restructure U.S. forces to reduce dramatically the ground forces that make up such a 
large fraction of today’s military, and shift toward a much greater reliance on standoff 
precision engagement forces and the SOF teams needed to direct their fire.  In Korea, for 
example, many analysts believe that our South Korean allies could at least match their 
enemy’s skills as the Northern Alliance did against the Taliban, and this would suggest 
that large U.S. ground forces may be less necessary for the defense of the peninsula than 
is often supposed.112 
The precision with which these wars were conducted proved vital from a military 
perspective because the limited number of weapons required to achieve a specific result 
corresponded to the limited logistics tail the United States could bring to bear in the 
region.  One implication of this type warfare is that small units gain enormously in 
firepower.  A battalion properly supported can perform the work of a brigade.  
Concentration in investment shifts from platforms and mass units to remote sensing and 
network coordination.  The bottom-line effect may be in cutting down the size of our 
force structure.113 
                                                 
110 Friedman, 163-164. 
111 Friedman, 212. 
112 Biddle, 50. 
113 Friedman, 213-216. 
37
In general, during this last decade, access has been granted to U.S. and allied 
aircraft, especially when a host nation’s national interests are threatened.  Access 
restrictions will always impact operations; however, Operation Allied Force proved that 
employment from great distances is possible when conducting sustained operations and 
forward basing need not be a major limitation.  These wars also demonstrated the value 
of naval forces which could operate free of bases.  This independence encouraged 
neighboring states to offer basing facilities, which made it possible to conduct the war 
more efficiently.114 
D. MILITARY LIMITATIONS  
The success of a military operation often depends on the local operational 
capabilities.  Local infrastructure may not be able to support a planned deployment of 
U.S. forces.  Whatever the mission, the first step in implementation is to deliver forces 
and equipment into the area of operations.  In Central Asia and the South Caucasus the 
distance to the region, rough terrain, and lack of infrastructure, as well as access to 
airfields and ports posed significant challenges.  The degree of the challenge depends on 
how much material and equipment must be transported into the region.115  Since the 
distance from Ramstein AB to the combat area was more than 3,500 miles and the C-17 
range is approximately 2,600 miles, refueling was required enroute.116 
The conflict in Afghanistan confirmed the value of favorable military positioning, 
planning, preparing and executing in major campaigns.  U.S. maritime, land-based 
aircraft, and ground forces, and their logistical supplies had to be moved into the area 
from thousands of miles away.  In the initial phases, America lacked adequate host nation 
support to insert its ground forces and tactical land-based aircraft into the region.  That is 
why the U.S. Navy’s carrier battle groups played such a critical role.117  This limitation 
should not be a shortfall in places where access and pre-positioned supplies and 
equipment are already available, such as in Japan, Korea, and Guam. 
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While some may think the new technologies passed the test of the revolution in 
military affairs, the Taliban and Iraqi forces never had a chance to challenge the 
overwhelming power of America.  Air defenses that were virtually non-existent 
accounted for U.S. air superiority in only a matter of hours.  The enemy did not have the 
capability to effectively respond to the attack.  The United States will still have to be on 
its guard against a tougher, more adept foe.118 
Despite having allies around the world, there is no such thing as “assured” access 
to the territory of any other sovereign power.  Regardless of what treaties, agreements, or 
understandings may be in place, nations retain ultimate control of their territory and 
airspace.119  In addition, even when access is granted, the facilities in a host nation may 
not be suited for American requirements.  For example, although some bordering states, 
all ex-Soviet, were sympathetic to the war on terror, use of their bases required build-up 
since spares and maintenance facilities were absent.  Whatever airbases they offered at 
the outset could only support limited aircraft operations.120  
Sea basing also poses limitations.  In order to gain mobility, ships carry only 
limited numbers of aircraft and munitions.  These limitations made the precision weapons 
all the more crucial in the war.  One reason that the United States did not immediately 
attack Iraq after Afghanistan was that it needed to replenish weapon stocks.121  Another 
limit is that carrier-based aircraft have to be refueled in order to strike deep inland.  
Refueling operations relied heavily on U.S. and British tankers based in Kuwait, Oman, 
and the UAE.  However, even if these countries had vetoed aircraft refueling operations 
from their bases, the U.S. carrier aircraft still had the capability of refueling each other 
using the buddy-system.122 
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IV. CAPABILITY AND COMMITMENT VS. PERMANENT 
PRESENCE:  THE EXAMPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
The loss of forward basing in an allied country does not necessarily mean a loss in 
deterrence, nor does it automatically result in instability within the region.  Credible U.S. 
capability and commitment reinforced by strong and positive engagement may produce 
the same desired effects of forward basing. 
A. THE U.S-PHILIPPINES DEFENSE ALLIANCE  
On 14 March 1947 President Roxas and U.S. Ambassador Paul MacNutt signed 
the U.S.-Philippines “Military Bases Agreement.”  It formalized the use of 23 bases and 
installations by the United States in the Philippines.123  The military basing agreement 
received most of the publicity when the U.S. military was ousted from the Philippines in 
1992; however, the United States had various other treaties or pacts that marked its 
comprehensive relationship with the Philippines.  The 12 March 1947 “Military 
Assistance Act” committed the United States to assist in the development of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including creation of the Joint United States Military 
Advisory Group (JUSMAG) to assist in the training and equipping of the AFP.124        
The United States entered into another agreement with the Philippines called the 
“Military Assistance Pact.”  It was signed on 21 March 1947 and obligated the U.S. 
armed forces to equip and train the AFP.  The Philippines and the United States also have 
a long-standing agreement for mutual defense.  On 30 August 1951, the signing of the 
“Mutual Defense Treaty” further strengthened the U.S.-Philippines relations.  Article 4 of 
the treaty states that “each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific on either 
of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would 
act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its own constitutional processes.”125 
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An armed attack on either of the parties includes an armed attack on the territory 
of either of the nations, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific 
Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.126 
The original Military Bases Agreement was intended as a 99-year lease but was 
revised in 1966 to allow only 25 years from the date of the revision.  On 16 September 
1991, a quarter of a century later, by a vote of 12 to 11, the Philippine Senate rejected to 
extend the lease.  The American flag was lowered for the last time at Subic Bay on 24 
November, 1992.127  The next section examines some of the causes for the Philippine 
Senate’s rejection of the basing agreement and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. forces. 
B. WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES    
The Philippines rejection of an extension to the basing agreement and the 
withdrawal of U.S. armed forces resulted from a combination of international and 
domestic factors and natural forces. The end of the Cold War brought about pressures for 
reduced American forces presence worldwide.  The closure of the bases in the Philippines 
occurred in the same period as American domestic support for overseas forces waned and 
political pressure for base closures and military downsizing gained momentum.  This 
period was also a time of political turmoil in the Philippines, when the nationalist 
movement to remove U.S. military bases was at its peak.  Many Filipinos believed that 
they were never given the same respect by the United States as other countries such as 
Japan and those in Europe.  Many Filipinos did not consider themselves to be completely 
independent so long as the Americans continued to occupy bases in their country. Others 
resented the nearly century-long presence of the United States in their country and the 
continuing American support of the Marcos “dictatorship.”128 
In terms of renegotiating the military bases agreement, the Philippines was 
bargaining for a lofty $1.5 billion annually in exchange for use of the bases, while 
American diplomats were negotiating with figures at the low end of the spectrum, $450 
million per year.  After Mount Pinatubo erupted from 12-15 June 1991 and blanketed                                                  
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Clark Air Base in ash, the United States lost its desire to use this airfield and offered $203 
million annually for the use of Subic Bay.  Nicholas Pratt the American ambassador not 
only knew that this figure was unacceptable to the Philippines; he also doubted that the 
U.S. Congress would even approve the proposed 10-year, $2 billion dollar treaty.129 
Mother Nature complicated matters further when Typhoon Yunya struck the 
northern Philippine islands at the same time as the major eruption of Mt. Pinatubo on 15 
June.   The resulting damages from collapsed, ash-laden buildings, flooded homes, and 
looted facilities drove estimates for restoring Clarke AFB after Pinatubo to between $600 
and $800 million.  Congress would hardly authorize that kind of money even if the 
Philippine Senate voted to retain the basing agreement.130 
Despite the pressures from all sides to discontinue basing U.S. forces in the 
Philippines, the United States and the Philippines still valued their alliance.  The next 
section demonstrates the will and commitment of both countries to support their 
comprehensive security relationship. 
C. CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT  
1. Other Agreements and Comprehensive Security: 
Despite the Philippine rejection of the Military Bases Agreement and the 
American forces withdrawal, the two countries remained defense allies based on the 1951 
Mutual Defense Treaty.  The United States also insisted that it would remain a Pacific 
power, hoping to continue projecting its influence in the region.131  The rejection of the 
basing agreement did not void the other agreements, namely the Military Assistance 
Agreement, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.  These agreements 
guaranteed U.S.-Philippine security and defense.132 
Not only are the United States and the Philippines bound by the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty, they are bound by long-standing investments, the presence of over 
100,000 Americans in the Philippines and 2.2 million Filipinos in the United States.  In 
1992, nearly a century of U.S. military presence ended.  Former President Ramos 
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dismissed the idea that the American departure created a power vacuum in the region.  
“What is more important than basing forces on land is the continued presence, 
engagement, and commitment of the only remaining superpower.”133 
In his meeting with Philippine President Ramos, President Clinton said that 
“cooperative U.S-Philippine relations would continue despite the recent closure of two 
huge U.S. bases” in the Philippines.  President Clinton continued, “the end of the Cold 
War and the closure of our bases there has not changed the basis for continuing 
cooperation between our two nations…such cooperation will be based on investment ties, 
mutual security interests and the democratic ideals both countries hold.”134 
President Ramos supported Clinton’s remarks by stating that the region’s security 
should not be based solely on defense treaties or joint military exercises with U.S. forces 
but also on economic development.  “We foresee a long period of stability and prosperity 
in the region; however, for this to be the case, the United States must remain 
engaged.”135 
In 1992, more than 25,000 U.S. troops departed Asia, mostly due to the Philippine 
base closings.  Despite this withdrawal, from the perspective of other Southeast Asian 
nations, the United States still retained access to the region through its landing rights and 
facilities in several nations.  Malaysia’s Defense Minister, Datuk Mohamed Najib Abdul 
Razak said “The U.S. forces can still operate anywhere, of course, but regional powers 
will be expected to play a much more influential role.  This is a natural process.”136   
“In any event, analysts agreed that the U.S. military could defend the Philippines 
through the 7th Fleet and Ready Reaction Marine Task forces without stationing troops in 
the country which suited the current security scenario as well as the Philippine pride over  
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the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA.)”137  The next section demonstrates how America 
continued supporting the Philippines through various forms of aid, training, and 
exercises. 
2. Aid, Training, and Exercises 
Though the United States withdrew its military forces from the Philippines, it 
continued to provide financial aid and military assistance to its ally.  For example, in 
1993, the United States provided $156 million in financial aid, $45 million in military 
assistance and $2.45 million in International Military and Education Training (IMET).138  
Though U.S. aid to the Philippines decreased after its armed forces departed, it hovered 
around $50 million per year in the mid 1990s.139 
Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the U.S.-Philippine security relationship 
evolved to fit the current security system.  America gradually established a post-bases 
relationship consistent with its activities elsewhere in the region—exercises, warship 
visits, exchanges, and policy dialogues.140 
In Asia, U.S. force presence played a key role in promoting peace and security in 
the region; however, it was only one element of the U.S. overseas engagement in the 
region that included conventional diplomacy, international trade and investment, 
educational, scientific and cultural exchanges.  The diversity of U.S. policy reflected a 
comprehensive overseas engagement to protect and promote security interests in Asia.141 
After the Philippines discontinued the basing agreement, it continued to conduct 
annual military training exercises with the United States through 1995.  Much of the 
exercise program was on hiatus until 1998 when the United States and the Philippines 
resolved the legal issues of the Visiting Forces Agreement.  The current U.S.-Philippine  
                                                 
137 Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” p. 11. 
138 IMET is intended to allow the United States to do the following: Retain contact and influence with 
the Philippine military in the absence of the day-to-day relationship that existed prior to the bases 
withdrawal; uphold its R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty responsibilities; ensure that the Philippine military 
is competent and compatible with the United States’ military; maximize joint training and interoperability 
as outlined in the East Asian Strategy Initiative; and continue to support democracy and human rights in the 
Philippines.  See Jennifer Morrison Taw, “Thailand and the Philippines:  Case Studies in the U.S. IMET 
Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development,” (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand, 1994), 39-40.   
139 Donald Kirk, Looted:  The Philippines after the Bases, 19. 
140 Micool Brooke, “Future of US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty,” 6. 
141 Ibid, 7. 
44
relations include a number of annual combined exercises, the most important of which is 
Balikatan, which is designed to improve planning, readiness and interoperability between 
the forces.142 
U.S. Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing also play a key role in 
supporting American regional policy.  The United States also participates in a number of 
combined training activities that improve dialogue and exchange between countries, 
reduce misperceptions, increase understanding of security concerns, and build confidence 
between the two defense establishments to avoid accidents or miscalculations.143 
One of the lessons the United States can learn from losing its bases in the 
Philippines is to avoid heavy reliance on support from any one country.  Expanded 
relations and cooperation with ASEAN is imperative.  Since the removal of U.S. bases 
from the Philippines, other ASEAN nations have been more accommodating of U.S. 
military forces.  While America lost bases in the Philippines it acquired access to ports in 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.  American presence is only one element of 
stability in the region; cooperation among ASEAN nations is the foundation of 
security.144 
Exercise CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training) is an example of 
this cooperation.  Each ASEAN state with the exception of Vietnam participates with 
U.S. armed forces in training and military assistance.  Other exercises include Cobra 
Gold with Thailand, and search and rescue operations with Malaysia and Indonesia.145 
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ASEAN joins with the United States to prevent conflict, enhance stability, 
promote economic growth, and assure that the interests of all nations are considered.  
ASEAN also advocates continued U.S. military presence in the region.  Port access 
agreements, military training and education programs, and other bilateral and multilateral 
security-related frameworks complement U.S. overseas presence and further affirm 
Southeast Asia’s increasing importance as a regional partner for enhancing security.146 
Presence goals are being achieved with “places not bases” in East Asia.  This 
policy of accessibility within East Asia not only meets the end objective of American 
strategy but continues to foster alliances with our Pacific neighbors.  Former 
USCINCPAC, Admiral Pendley pointed out, “Access agreements are not gifts and there 
will be costs in the form of military assistance, improvements in infrastructure, regional 
exercises, and political engagement.  These costs will be insignificant, however, when 
measured against maintaining the flexibility and necessary capability to protect U.S. 
forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region and in to the Persian Gulf.”147 
Losing the Philippine bases did not change American strategy in the region.  On 
the contrary, events in the 1990s demonstrated United States commitment to the region 
was still strong.  In 1996 it ordered two carrier battle groups to Taiwan during the Straits 
crisis, and America continued to demonstrate its will and commitment via bilateral 
exercises, country assist teams and routine port visits. With the “places not bases” policy, 
the United States still garners its access, presence, and influence programs within the 
region without the Asian anxieties of permanent American basing.148 
Throughout the 1990s, the Philippines remained one of the weakest nations in 
Eastern Asia in terms of its economy and military and gave the perception of greater 
vulnerability to external threats.  To a large extent, this vulnerability kept the Philippines-
U.S. ties close despite public cries for greater independence.  The next section examines 
the  Spratly  Islands  issue  as  a  cause  for  greater  security  concern  in  the  Philippines.   
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During this foray with China, the Philippines still clutched the specter of American 
military power like a security blanket—it may have been old and worn but it was still 
reliable in times of serious threat.149 
3. The South China Sea 
China has claimed the Spratlys based on historical rights that date back 1700 
years to the Han dynasty.  In February 1972, Beijing officially declared the Spratly 
Islands as an integral part of China.  China forcibly took the Paracels from South 
Vietnam in 1974, then clashed with Vietnam over the Spratlys in 1988, sinking three 
Vietnamese ships.150 
The Spratlys are disputed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei.  The 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea urged a peaceful 
settlement of conflicting territorial claims and the need to cooperate in order to ensure the 
safety of maritime navigation and communication as well as other forms of security 
cooperation.  China disregarded this appeal and in 1995 seized Mischief Reef, 150 miles 
west of the Philippine Island of Palawan by stationing troops and building structures on 
the island.  Relations between the two countries deteriorated as the Philippines arrested 
Chinese fishermen in the area and destroyed Chinese markers on the islands.  Whereas 
the Philippines hoped to settle the issue via international law, China did not consider 
itself bound by the Manila Declaration.151 
Despite agreeing to not change the status quo in the South China Sea through 
unilateral steps and to seek a peaceful solution through negotiations, the PRC continued 
to test the political will of Vietnam and the Philippines as well as their support within 
ASEAN.  In August 1995, Beijing and the Philippines agreed to a code of conduct to 
prevent any direct confrontation over the Spratly Islands.  Beijing’s strategy of limiting 
alliances against it has been largely successful as China has frustrated attempts made by 
some ASEAN countries to internationalize the dispute.  Insisting on bilateral negotiations 
provides China with considerable leverage over its much weaker opponents.152 
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In October 1995, President Ramos begged the United States to flex its muscles 
against China’s new military, economic, and political might.  “Only with U.S. help, only 
with America’s leadership, are we to have lasting regional stability.”153  The mutual 
defense agreement with America is important to the Philippines as it is undergoing a 
military modernization drive.  The U.S. military may provide added security to the 
Philippines in case China again attempts to claim some of the disputed Spratly Islands.  
One Filipino intelligence officer stated “Our neighbors will not take us lightly – if they 
bully us, we can call upon a bigger bully.”154 
The United States and the Philippines differ in one important provision of the 
treaty, concerns over the Spratly Islands.  The American interpretation is that the treaty 
does not require the United States to intervene for the Philippines over the Spratly 
Islands, especially since the Philippines did not formally claim the islands until after the 
treaty was signed.  The Philippines disagrees and believes that America is obligated to 
come to its aid given armed conflict over the Spratlys.155 
As presented in a Department of State briefing on 10 May 1995, “The United 
States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over 
the various islands, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea.”  Since the United 
States does not recognize any nation’s claims to the Spratlys, it has no obligation to 
respond under its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines.  However, the Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) are another story and are of great concern to the United States.  
The United States measures the value of the South China Seas as it relates to the 
expanding  Asian  economy  and  the  SLOCs  are  integral  to  international  trade.156  
The United States warned China that it will not accept any restrictions on freedom 
of movement for its ships in the area.  Establishing sovereignty over the Spratlys would 
entail some sort of control over the shipping lanes passing through the Malacca Straits.157  
Former Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon said that U.S. officials promised to defend the 
                                                 
153 Donald Kirk, Looted:  The Philippines after the Bases, 19. 
154 Adam Easton, “Filipinos Toss a Hot Potato:  Letting US GIs Back,” Global Newsbank, Christian 
Science Monitor, 5 March 1998, 8. 
155 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast Asia, 27 April 2004. 
156 Earl K. Hampton, Jr., “Subic Bay:  The Last Five Years Has USCINCPAC Strategy Changed?” 5. 
157 Frank Umbach, “Trends in the Regional Balance of Power and Potential Hotspots,” International 
Security Quarterly, 30 June 2002, 9. 
48
Philippines in the worst case: a shooting war in the Spratlys.  Even if America does not 
enter into a shooting war over the Spratlys, the U.S. military presence in the Spratlys will 
be more visible.158 
When the Philippine Navy discovered four Chinese ships anchored near the 
Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, the United States and Philippine navies 
responded in the guise of a live firing exercise in the vicinity.  In October 1998, the 
Philippines discovered China had completed new hardened structures on Mischief Reef, 
including three-story buildings, a new pier, an observation post, a military command 
center, gun emplacements, and radar facilities at four different sites—a helipad was still 
under construction.  The Philippines responded with a major naval deployment in the area 
and by detaining 20 Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Mischief Reef.159 
The mutual defense treaty with America is not the only way to defend the 
Philippines.  The interrelated dynamics that may be created by conflict over disputed land 
increases the possibility for America’s intervention.  Upsetting the balance of power can 
prompt U.S. military intervention, regardless of whether or not there is a treaty calling for 
immediate retaliation.  America has a big economic and security stake in maintaining the 
balance of power in the region.  Japan and ASEAN have big stakes in a credible U.S. 
presence in the region.160  75 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass through the South China 
Sea.  The United States is obliged to assist Japan out of self interests.  The security and 
stability of Asia are as much American concerns as they are Asian concerns.161 
While the United States refuses to go to war over the Spratly Islands on the 
grounds that it is not part of the mutual defense treaty, America, Japan, and ASEAN 
cannot remain indifferent to any escalation of the dispute between the Philippines and 
China.  Any aggression between these two countries will immediately create insecurity 
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among other ASEAN members and over the critical role of America in maintaining peace 
and the balance of power in the Pacific.162 
The Philippines is not the only country nervous about the Spratlys.  It is important 
to note that the rest of Asia is also afraid of China’s military posturing.  Standing 
together, these countries have a better chance of success.  ASEAN is stronger if it 
remains united.  There is no way the Philippines can defeat China militarily even if 
Manila spent its entire but paltry $20 billion government budget on defense.  The real 
deterrent of China lies in diplomacy not military operations.  The Philippines belongs to 
ASEAN, a group to which China ascribes importance.  The Philippines has also appealed 
to America, more so by means of a diplomatic arsenal rather than via military protection 
to restrain China.163 
After years of negotiation, ASEAN nations and China agreed to sign the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002.  The 
declaration was a step in the right direction but did not establish a legally binding code.  
All claimants have failed to relent from their strong position of sovereignty over the 
islands.  ASEAN could not develop a binding code because China refused to relinquish 
its undisputed claim and because China had bilateral talks with individual members and 
succeeded in dividing them with bilateral codes of conduct.  China seems prepared to 
sign only a non-binding multilateral code of conduct to focus on dialogue and regional 
stability rather than on issues of sovereign jurisdiction.164 
While events in the South China Sea provided opportunities for U.S.-Philippines 
rapprochement, the next section examines other factors that energized their relations. 
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D. IMPROVED U.S.-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS 
After the closure of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the U.S.-Philippine 
relations were somewhat strained for several years.  As already noted, the perceived 
China threat brought the two nations closer together towards a common purpose.  Other 
factors also encouraged improved relations as both nations realized they could benefit 
more by working together.  Economic and military gains as well as an enhanced feeling 
of security against both internal and external threats influenced the Philippines’ decision 
to resume closer ties with America.  These benefits resulted from increased combined 
exercise and training schedules spurred by the Chinese threat and the U.S.-led war 
against terrorism, and were made possible by the Visiting Forces Agreement.  For its 
part, the United States, achieved a greater stronghold against global terrorism and 
reestablished critical access to bases within Southeast Asia from which it could serve as a 
balancer among regional powers and as a stabilizing force for the entire region. 
In commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual 
Defense Treaty, Presidents Arroyo and Bush “agreed to strengthen the military alliance 
on a sustained basis, through increased training, exercises, and other joint activities.”165 
1. Economic Factors 
When President Bush visited the Philippines in October 2003, he announced that 
the Philippines had a new designation as a major non-NATO ally, a category that 
includes Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, South 
Korea, and Thailand.166  U.S. and Philippines defense leaders agreed on a new five-year 
plan for increased U.S. military assistance and to establish a senior civilian group for 
coordinating military policy, further strengthening a Pacific alliance that has gained 
renewed prominence in the Bush administration’s global war on terrorism.  Other 
assistance provided by the United States has included road-building, well-digging, and 
other economic aid that has generated local good will and breathed new life into a 
military alliance that was battered when U.S. forces were evicted in 1992.167 
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U.S. military aid increased from $38 million in 2001 to $114 million in 2003.  In 
fact, the Philippines is the world’s fourth largest recipient of U.S. foreign military 
financing and Asia’s most significant beneficiary of the U.S. IMET program.  President 
Bush committed more than $95 million in military and financial assistance in 2003 and 
also pledged to provide continued assistance against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).168 
President Bush promised 20 UH-1 helicopters and an additional 10 for spare 
parts.  He also signed a proclamation expanding product coverage for the Philippines 
under the Generalized System of Preferences, providing $30 million in trade benefits, $30 
million in new grant aid for equipment and training for AFP to counter terrorism, $30 
million in new bilateral development assistance for Mindanao, and $25 million in new 
grant assistance to train and equip a combat engineering unit.  In March 2004, the United 
States transferred a refurbished ‘Cyclone’ Class coastal patrol ship, including a two-year 
supply of spare parts, a package valued at $30 million.  In October 2003, the U.S. 
Ambassador and the Secretary of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Intent to enhance 
the anti-terrorism and anti-crime activities of the Philippine National Police.  In addition, 
America is helping the Philippines to strengthen its law enforcement through training, 
equipment, and organizational reforms.  President Bush also asked the U.S. Congress to 
allocate $164 million for military and economic assistance for the Philippines in 2005.169   
2. Visiting Forces Agreement 
The United States and Philippines signed the VFA on 10 February 1998.  The 
VFA is essentially concerned with the legal issues and jurisdiction surrounding the 
treatment of U.S. armed forces and defense personnel who would be in the Philippines 
for purposes covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty.  It provides substance to the treaty 
by serving as the legal framework in promoting defense cooperation between the 
Philippines and the United States.  It underscored the fundamental importance of U.S.-
Philippine military alliance in maintaining peace and security in East Asia and Southeast 
Asia.170 
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The VFA allows the United States and the Philippines to resume regular large-
scale military exercises and port calls after a three-year impasse.171  In 1999, the 
Philippines Senate ratified the VFA.  The first major combined military exercise under 
this new agreement occurred in February 2000, Exercise Balikatan; another occurred in 
May 2003.172 
The United States requested the VFA due to the lack of a “Status of Forces 
Agreement” (SOFA).173  The visit of then President Fidel Ramos to Washington in April 
1998 affirmed the mutual commitment to the timely resumption of U.S. training activities 
in the Philippines.  Familiarity, cooperation, and interoperability are important 
ingredients to a strong alliance.  America has clearly stated that it seeks to develop the 
defense relationship in ways and at a pace comfortable to the Philippines.  In its 
continuing dispute with China over Spratly island claims, President Estrada believed that 
the VFA would serve as an effective deterrent against China’s expansionary tendencies in 
the South China Sea.174 
The VFA was not instituted without resistance from the host country.  Many 
contended that the VFA violated the Philippines sovereignty, and its constitution, and that 
it was lopsided in nature because it favored the Americans.175  The vice president of the 
Philippines resigned over differences with President Arroyo in foreign policy concerning 
the United States.  The vice president was opposed to two agreements between the 
Philippines and the United States.  One extended and expanded the war games to include 
the destruction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the other, the Mutual 
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), provided the U.S. forces on Filipino soil with 
“billeting, transportation, communication and medical services, base operations support, 
storage  services,  use  of  facilities,  training  services,  repair  and  maintenance services,  
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calibration services, and port services.  Some Filipinos felt that the shift by Arroyo ended 
the Philippines’ short period of sovereignty and placed it back within the United States’ 
tight embrace.176 
Nothing in the VFA violates the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or constitutional 
rights of the Filipinos, rather it reflects the government’s commitment to fulfill its 
obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty, in the spirit of cooperation, to satisfy 
mutual security and defense interests in East Asia.177   
3. War on Terror 
Ties warmed up between the United States and the Philippines after the 11 
September terrorist attacks when Arroyo invited America to use the Philippines airspace 
for “war on terror.”  In return, the Philippines received million-dollar pledges of military 
and economic aid as well as military support to quash the ASG.178  The common threat of 
terrorism helped thaw the security alliance between the U.S. and the Philippines.179  By 
September 2001, the Philippines had granted the United States full access to its ports and 
airfields to assist in the war against terrorism.180  Washington sought to maintain a 
presence in the South China Sea, and the ‘war on terrorism’ provided the United States an 
opportunity to consolidate its ties with is ally.   
After 9/11, the United States increased its military engagement in the Philippines 
to hunt for Al-Qaeda cells.  The improved relations with the Philippines offered America 
the opportunity to project power in the region and strengthen its access to naval facilities 
and bases.  The United States increased its force deployment in Basilan from 650 to 950 
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in 2002.  In May 2003, the countries negotiated for another deployment further south 
against the ASG terrorist group.  U.S. forces also held Balikatan 2004 exercises in 
Central Luzon, Batanes, and Palawan involving 2,500 U.S. troops and 2,300 Filipinos.181 
In 2003, when referring to the American intent to send more troops to fight 
terrorism in the Philippines, Derek Mitchell, an Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies said “It also is a chance to finish a job begun last year and, by 
doing so, demonstrate continued commitment and strengthen a critical alliance with the 
Philippines.”182  The new initiative was considered by Pentagon officials as a strategic 
opportunity to reinforce a crucial alliance with the Philippines. 
4. Regional Stability 
Improved relations not only offered the Philippines the opportunity to improve 
security within the Philippines, it provided the United States with another essential option 
for its visiting vessels and troops in the region.  On the domestic side, it provided relative 
economic stability and a sense of control over peace and order within the country.  On the 
international side, the improved relations contributed to the greater stability of the region.  
The presence of the U.S. troops; helps bring peace and order to the affected areas as well 
as help deter China’s aggression.183 
The U.S. military presence, albeit temporary, serves as an important deterrent.  
The U.S. military presence allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage 
potential threats, and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes.184  The United States 
does not seek to establish a permanent base in the Philippines but instead seeks “flexible 
arrangements” to help meet the future challenges of security in the Asia-Pacific region.185 
The presence of military forces engaged in joint training exercises with the 
Philippines gives other nations in Southeast Asia a sense of security.  This sense of 
security encourages nations to engage in multilateral cooperation, instead of seeking 
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strength through arms races.  The United States benefited from a number of access 
agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asia that have supported continued 
American engagement.  These arrangements include allowing port calls, repair facilities, 
training ranges and logistics support and have become increasingly important to U.S. 
overseas presence.  Singapore offered the use of its Changi Naval Base, and a pier that 
can accommodate aircraft carriers.186  With the ability to park an aircraft carrier in the 
region, America was sending a message to all of Asia that it could and would remain a 
factor in regional security even without permanent bases and that Singapore was willing 
to help.187 
America’s level of commitment to the Philippines is interpreted as a sign of 
Washington’s commitment to the rest of the region; this perception makes joint military 
exercises more than mere war games.  By working with the Philippines, the United States 
mitigates fears about a dwindling American presence and sends a signal to the world that 
it has not forgotten its allies.188 
Though the U.S-Philippines relationship soured in the aftermath of the eviction of 
U.S. military and its bases in 1992, it was sustained through the mutual defense treaty and 
other military assistance pacts.  The United States did not abandon its ally; on the 
contrary, it remained committed to defense of the Philippines and to regional stability. 
Recognizing the mutual benefits of closer ties, both countries worked to establish 
a Visiting Forces Agreement which provided the Philippines with increased economic, 
military, and security benefits while allowing the United States periodic access to critical 
bases without the intrusive effects of a permanent footprint.  The U.S.-led war against 
terror solidified the U.S.-Philippines relationship, once again providing a cohesive 
common goal—a defense against a common threat.  The U.S.-Philippines relations may 
have lain dormant for several years; however, like Mt. Pinatubo, awakened after a long 
sleep, the U.S.-Philippines relations were heated by internal and external forces, and 
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when called upon, erupted to provide a stronghold against global terror and to strengthen 
security and stability throughout the region. 
Given its military advancements and advantages wrought by transformation 
initiatives, its successful application of new concepts and technology in a new way of 
war, and its commitment to defend allies and national interests, what changes has the 
United States been willing to make regarding its force posture?  The next section details 
some of America’s latest plans to restructure its military posture around the world and 
analyzes whether these steps coincide with its capabilities. 
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V. THE IMPACT OF CAPABILITES AND COMMITMENT ON 
U.S. FORCE POSTURE POLICY 
A. GLOBAL PRESENCE       
In light of the new international environment, security threats, and military 
capabilities, Secretary Rumsfeld called for an overhaul of the U.S. military presence 
worldwide.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan supported his idea that smaller, more 
mobile forces could be as effective if not more effective as the traditional conventional 
forces.189 
Through its recent words and actions concerning troop structure and positioning, 
the United States further corroborates what military transformation and the 
aforementioned conflicts have established, that U.S. military capabilities far exceed those 
of any other nation and preclude the traditional organizational structuring and positioning 
of forces. 
In August 2004, President George Bush announced U.S. plans to reposition about 
70,000 U.S. troops from overseas bases.  The president stated that American forces are 
more agile, more lethal, and more capable of striking anywhere around the globe on short 
notice.  Some of these troops will be withdrawn, others positioned in other areas around 
the world to be able to quickly respond to unexpected threats.  U.S. administration 
officials noted that America is attempting to portray the strength of its commitment to its 
allies in terms of capabilities not in the number of troops.  The technological prowess of 
the U.S. military in terms of its ability to project power over great distances supports such 
troop withdrawals.190 
The broader plan includes eliminating a number of large U.S. bases from 
overseas, bringing some troops home and repositioning others abroad, while constructing 
skeletal outposts and dispersing critical equipment in regions that portend potential 
hotspots of trouble.191  The aim is to create flexible, small units that could be moved 
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quickly to temporary bases.  To calm Russian encirclement fears, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell stated that “What we are interested in are, perhaps, forward operating locations 
that we could train at temporarily, or we can have agreements at particular airfields that 
make it easier for us to deploy to particular areas of potential crisis.”192 
The U.S. forward basing concept has drawn increasing attention especially in 
Korea, Japan, and Germany, where the original purpose for stationing U.S. troops abroad 
was to thwart the advance of Soviet communism.  While a valid North Korean threat 
remains, it lacks the credibility of a “world expansionist” and is increasingly viewed by 
the United States in light of its potential influence as an exporter or supporter of global 
terror and for its potential to upset East Asia’s stability.  In light of its perception of North 
Korea as a rogue state, the United States still deems an American military presence in 
South Korea as vital to maintaining peace and stability in the region.  However, as U.S. 
Senators Hutchison and Feinstein indicated, while we may need more troops abroad, 
clearly the needs are different then they once were, and it is critical that America moves 
beyond the Cold War basing concepts.193 
Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, 
corroborated the senators’ viewpoints by indicating that U.S. forward presence in Korea 
needs to be modernized; it needs to be flexible; it needs to transcend regional theater 
bounds so it can be incorporated into the global theater.  The United States wants the 
flexibility to use forces in Korea as needed around the world.  The United States wants 
facilities and bases to transform from service-oriented installations to joint ones.194 
The initiative to consolidate U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is an excellent example, 
a microcosm, of the transformative force-posture process underway in PACOM and the 
DoD.  For over 50 years, the U.S military on the Korean peninsula has been solidly 
entrenched in its structure, doctrine, training, and procedures.  Personnel stationed in 
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Korea have always been considered taboo or off-limits in terms of considering them for 
deployments to other regions or hot spots. 
Now personnel stationed in Korea are no longer considered off-limits when 
considering them for global commitments.  Case in point is the transfer of 3,600 troops 
from Korea to Iraq and the recent deployment of six B-52s to Guam to make up for the 
combat power lost in the Pacific caused by rotating troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.  In 
order to relieve the burden of 130,000 American troops in Iraq, the Pentagon is forced to 
draw on military units worldwide.195  The United States has plans to withdraw 12,500 of 
the 37,000 troops from Korea by the end of 2005.196  According to General Leon 
LaPorte, Commander U.S. Forces Korea, the specific reorganization plan in Korea calls 
for relocating the Yongson Army base function out of Seoul to Pyongtaek, located about 
50 miles south of Seoul and consolidating the remaining 41 major installations and 90 
facilities into several central hubs further south of Seoul.  The plan returns half the land, 
32,000 acres granted to the U.S. forces under the SOFA agreement.197 
The Second Infantry Division’s move from north of Seoul to new hubs further 
south is intended to produce a far-reaching change in America’s entire East Asian 
security posture.  Where it once was stuck in an inflexible, defensive position close to the 
DMZ, the shift of the division further south will permit the United States to deploy the 
division anywhere within PACOM.198  According to Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of 
defense, the changes are part of the U.S. military worldwide posture review and are 
“pointed to a new ability to integrate our forces into joint operations.”  He also added that 
“we place a great premium on mobility, on the ability to move great distances rapidly, 
and to use temporary basing solutions as needed.”199 
Christopher Lafleur, State Department special envoy for Northeast Asia security 
consultations, emphasized that the expanding population in Seoul was encroaching on the 
U.S. forces and their training regimen.  The move further south is not only intended to 
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relieve anti-American pressure by reducing the military footprint, but to also take 
advantage of new military capabilities and to enhance the mobility of U.S. forces and 
their ability to rapidly deploy.200  The global posture review is not to weaken but to 
strengthen America’s defense relationships with its friends and allies, improve flexibility, 
enhance regional and global action, exploit advantages in rapid power projection and 
focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers.201 
In addition to the proposed changes in Korea, the DoD is also planning to 
radically alter its forward-positioning strategy in Europe.  Over the past decade, the U.S. 
has reduced the number of its installations in Europe by 66 percent; yet there is still much 
to be accomplished in terms of trimming down the basing structure.  The asymmetric 
world and its associated threats, NATO’s expanding membership, the deepening crises in 
Africa, and the emergence of ungoverned regions where drug trafficking, criminality, and 
terrorism abound, argue for a drastic change in the paradigm of how the United States 
implements its basing structure.  America must not only maintain its most crucial 
infrastructure, it must also transform it into more agile, expeditionary, and efficient 
support mechanisms for our military forces.202 
The Pentagon plans to withdraw half of the 71,000 U.S. troops stationed in 
Germany.  Instead of maintaining a vast force in Germany, the United States plans on 
continued use of bases it established in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan) for combating terrorism in the region.203  The United States is also planning 
to use multiple sites in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania for their potential to host U.S. 
military forces.  This move is the latest stage in a U.S. plan to reposition EUROCOM 
forces   to   more  effectively  fight  the  war  on  terrorism  and  to  better  cope  with  the  
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asymmetric threats of the 21st century.  The sites will range from small facilities or 
airstrips for refueling to training facilities and bare-boned facilities to serve as combat 
launching pads into the region.204    
EUROCOM is working to identify truly “bare bones” facilities that can 
accommodate rotational forces.  These forces will come from anywhere around the world 
and be there for only a limited time for training, strategic engagement, or strategic 
response to a crisis.  These bases can go from active to inactive status, be turned on-and-
off very quickly.  Rotational forces could take advantage of this family of forward 
operating locations to perform a specific mission and then return home.  These facilities 
virtually make the 20th century-type base obsolete because they allow power projection 
anywhere in the world at a fraction of the cost.205 
According to General James Jones, American bases should have a 
transformational footprint, and be geo-strategically placed in areas where presence yields 
the highest return on investment.  Bases should contract and expand as required and be 
constructed in such a way as to take advantage of abilities to rotationally base forces 
coming from different parts of the world.  Flexible forward operating bases, smaller 
forward operating locations and new sites for pre-positioned equipment to augment a 
permanent strategic presence will prove to be extremely useful to future requirements.  
The United States no longer needs to build small American cities of the 20th century to 
achieve its strategic goals.206 
Senators Hutchison and Feinstein commended General Jones’ efforts and 
reinforced his comments by stating that the United States must also be in a position to 
engage in contingencies where America has no permanent bases such as Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Africa, and the Middle East.207 
In an attempt to purge festering terrorist sites in remote regions of the world, the 
United States is accelerating its efforts to expand its military reach into these areas.  The 
Pentagon is seeking military access into countries such as Cameroon and Mauritania.                                                   
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Morocco has offered America access to its military bases for exercises and U.S. troops 
are already training in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Tunisia.  Instead of building permanent 
facilities in these areas, the United States is planning to frequently rotate troops in and out 
of these camps to launch against actual terrorist threats and to deter potential threats.  
While the United States has previously avoided prolonged military involvement in such 
unstable regions, the mere instability itself provides a breeding ground for terrorists.208 
The Pentagon is also seeking access, logistics support, and places to pre-position 
equipment and supplies to minimize transportation requirements and to increase 
responsiveness.  These moves are being made in concert with friends and allies; indeed, 
the United States is attempting to strengthen its alliances in the process.209 
The strategy to create a more mobile, flexible, and lethal force capable of 
launching from any one or an assortment of these strategically located sites or “lily pad” 
bases and pre-positioning large volumes of equipment and supplies within various 
regions, both ashore and off-shore, expands U.S. capability and enables the United States 
to skirt national boundaries and political sensitivities about access.  While withdrawing 
forces from some areas may appear to decrease capability, the United States maintains 
that with its advanced technologies, fewer troops can possess greater capability.  
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith stated that the United States is “not 
focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas.  Instead, we are focused on 
increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends.”210 
The global threat requires a global presence.  With the terrorist threat based in 
some of the most remote locations on earth, the United States seeks to establish a military 
presence everywhere the terrorists are congregating.  The United States military cannot 
be satisfied with fighting and winning the nation’s wars, it must also discourage military 
competition and prevent wars from starting; therefore, according to Vice Admiral Arthur 
Cebrowski, it must be positioned around the world.211 
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Confirming this global presence initiative, the United States has bases or shares 
military installations in Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzystan and 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.  These sites can serve as forward outposts that are 
lightly garrisoned with rapidly deployable units, but that can also serve as surge points 
for greater U.S. force build-up as required to respond to a contingency.  A larger majority 
of bases will become forward operating sites and small support staffs will maintain them.  
The smaller sites in remote regions will be designated as cooperative security locations 
and will not have a permanent military presence but will serve as staging areas for troops 
requiring quick access for training or for engaging a threat.  The entire plan not only 
includes repositioning forces but also involves the pre-positioning of combat equipment 
in these staging areas and aboard ships.  Despite having more “outposts,” the Pentagon 
still plans to maintain a string of permanent strategic military hubs in closely allied 
countries like Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.212       
The lengthy build-up of forces and equipment in Iraq may have been the last 
operation of its kind.  If you have to wait a month to respond to a threat, the threat may 
have vanished by the time you deploy.  One of the goals is to avoid repeating the amount 
of lead-in time required for the war in Afghanistan where the United States had no 
forward presence.  It had to perform crisis management to secure basing, access, and 
overflight rights and the Marines had to deploy into Afghanistan from ships 400 miles 
away.213 
While preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marines experimented with 
high speed ships that could move thousands of troops and equipment 1,000 miles in one 
day.  With a shallower draft than most ships, these vessels will also be able to provide 
U.S. troops access to ports and places previously restricted to war planners.214 
Forward basing and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies are both forms of 
positioning strategies.  Training rotations are also forms of positioning forces on a 
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temporary or sustained basis without a permanent base.  Pre-positioning equipment 
allows cost-effective transportation without firmly committing the nation to a specific 
objective.215 
 Referring to the new force posture strategy, Douglas Feith, Pentagon 
undersecretary for policy and an architect of the global realignment plan stated that the 
idea of having a large force of forward-deployed forces could save deployment time was 
outmoded.  Some forward deployments result in costing time because host nation 
permission or negotiation is required.216 
Despite the military transformation, its success in military conflicts and proposed 
restructuring and repositioning of forces, the United States still clings to some of the 
traditional force structuring and posturing.  The next section provides an alternative 
approach. 
B. ALTERNATIVE  
An unlimited budget and limitless pool of military resources would diminish 
arguments against forward positioning military personnel in allied countries.  However 
budgets are limited and the pool of military personnel is being stretched thin.  Army 
Chief of Staff General Schoomaker indicated that it is no secret that the Iraq deployment 
of over 130,000 troops is severely testing the Army’s personnel limits.217  It is important 
then to consider the most effective means of deploying troops around the world. 
Because there are more effective ways of using military forces, and because there 
is nationalistic pressure from other countries to reduce or eliminate U.S. military 
presence, the DoD’s proposed changes to the military’s force posture around the globe is 
not as bold as the overall 70,000 troop reduction might indicate.  Partially withdrawing 
troops from bases in Korea, Japan, and Germany falls short of recognizing the true 
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impact of U.S. military advantages and clings to remnants of Cold War beliefs that a 
permanent physical presence is necessary to reassure allies and deter threats.  From the 
highest, most influential leaders in the United States including the President, Senators, 
and the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of Defense to retired and current military 
commanders, all emphasized that force posture is not about the numbers and placement 
of forces but about the capabilities of the forces.  Military capability and the commitment 
to use this instrument as necessary are key, not the physical presence in an allied nation. 
As Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the current leader of U.S. military transformation 
noted, the United States requires a global presence for a global mission against terror.  
And for that mission, America is establishing a temporary military presence in some of 
the most remote regions of the world because that is where terrorism breeds.  A 
permanent presence is not required in those countries nor is one needed in Japan or Korea 
to fight terror because the United States has already firmly established strong alliances 
and access agreements with these nations.  America can not only help fight terror in 
Northeast Asia without a permanent military presence, as it does so in the Philippines and 
other countries, it can also still deter, fight, and win a major conventional war in this 
region, however unlikely that type of conflict may seem, as it has so aptly demonstrated 
in Iraq.  The United States could send a much stronger message to its friends and allies as 
well as its potential enemies by withdrawing all U.S. military troops from these countries 
while still committing itself to their defense by expanding its physical presence in U.S. 
territories within the region and increasing its engagement practices with its friends and 
allies. 
 Maintaining access to bases, facilities, and equipment in a particular region is 
critical; however, access and pre-positioned materiel no longer mandate a forward 
military presence in Korea and Japan.  If the United States withdraws its forces, it must 
reassure its friends and foes alike, in a clear and unmistakable message, that it will honor 
its treaties and alliances with the same will and commitment demonstrated in the 
Philippines. 
 Instead of keeping a costly forward presence in Japan and Korea, the United 
States should redistribute those forces elsewhere around the globe, including American 
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soil.  In addition to withdrawing these forces, the United States should bolster its 
alliances with Japan and Korea through diplomatic and political means and increase, not 
decrease military exercises, education, and training programs, and collaboration in 
regional and global institutions and efforts.  Finally, the United States should continue the 
ongoing transformation process by improving its military capabilities, shoring up its 
defenses on its own turf, including places like Guam and Diego Garcia, and overcoming 
the shortfalls it currently faces with regard to the range and sustainability of its personnel, 
weapons and support systems. 
1. Bolster Alliances 
In discussing methods for improving U.S. commitment in the Pacific region, 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice referred to how the United States is working 
with allies and friends in the region to improve alliances, promote open trade and 
investment, and to encourage democracy across the globe.  Multilateral negotiations with 
North Korea to halt its nuclear program, and multilateral collaboration in the war against 
terrorism are several approaches the United States is using to demonstrate its 
commitment to the region.  Though the United States’ Pacific alliances were formed over 
50 years ago to counter a specific Soviet threat, they were also established based on the 
common values and goals that bond free nations.218 
Deterrence is one of the main arguments for maintaining a forward military 
presence in an allied nation.  Using deterrent threats or promises, the United States 
reassures and protects friends and allies.  For the deterrence to be credible the deterring 
nation must become so enmeshed with the country it is attempting to protect that there is 
no other choice but to defend it should an enemy attack.  To create a credible deterrent, 
the deterring nation can act aggressively to persuade an enemy from attacking.  The 
deterring nation can also relinquish the initiative to an enemy by creating a “tripwire” or 
placing its own personnel in harms way to guarantee a response to an attack.  Finally, a 
strong political commitment can serve as a deterrent because it places a nation’s honor in 
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the balance.219  Regardless of the changes the United States makes to its overseas force 
posture, allies and potential enemies should not doubt U.S. commitment.   
The United States can use a strong political commitment in Asia to continue 
reassuring allies and deterring foes. In Korea, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz stated that the Korean people do not need American troops as a “tripwire” to 
guarantee American involvement if North Korea attacks the South.  He also added that 
U.S. commitment to South Korea remains firm and should not be judged by the number 
of American troops in Korea but by the spirit of the Korea-U.S. defense treaty.220  
Wolfowitz even added that withdrawing and repositioning troops is designed to enhance 
deterrence not weaken it.221 
Allied nations can also help send a message of continuing commitment and 
deterrence by reinforcing diplomatic efforts.  Both South Korean and U.S. officials 
indicated that the reductions would not weaken their combined defense against North 
Korea.222  Seoul dismissed concerns about a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula in 
the event of U.S. troop withdrawals.  The Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Ban Ki-moon stated that the troop reductions in Korea are nothing new and that the 
government is taking measures to ensure the country’s security remains strong.223 
Unsuccessful U.S. interventions in Vietnam and Somalia can have lasting effects 
beyond the realm of military operations in that they can negatively affect America’s 
political will, reduce the credibility of U.S. military deterrence abroad, and raise potential 
adversaries’ perceptions of the contestability of U.S. power.  A nation must not only 
understand a foe’s capabilities and the threshold that must be reached to coerce him but 
must also effectively communicate to him that it has both the will and the capability to 
prevail.224 
                                                 
219 Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell, Desert Storm:  The Gulf War and What We Learned, 23. 
220 Yonhap News Agency, “US has “More than 150 Plans” to Build up Forces in South Korea – 
Wolfowitz,” Global News Wire, BBC Monitoring/BBC, 2 June 2003. 
221 Department of Defense, “U.S. Troops Slated to Move South from the Korean DMZ,” Federal 
Document Clearing House, Inc., 6 June 2003. 
222 Jack Kim and Rhee So-eui, “U.S. Plans to Cut Troops in S. Korea by a Third,” Seoul:  Reuters, 7 
June 2004. 
223 Reuben Staines, “Seoul Dismisses Concerns Over US Troop Pullout,” The Korea Times, 18 
August 2004. 
224 Ibid, 80-81 
68
To reinforce a strong political commitment, U.S. leaders must continue to send 
clear messages of intent to remain engaged and committed in the region.  In a speech to 
Asian defense ministers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld assured them that the 
withdrawal and repositioning of U.S. forces will not diminish America’s ability to 
respond to threats in the region.  A withdrawal of troops from South Korea does not 
signal a decrease in America’s ability to deter North Korea, nor do North Koreans believe 
it will weaken the deterrent.  Concentration on numbers versus capabilities misses the 
point that U.S. forces can do much more with much less.225 
Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, 
emphasized how an increase in capability could offset the effects of drawing down 
troops.  Regardless of the final outcome in the positioning of forces, the goal is to 
enhance, improve, upgrade, and modernize the military and its ability to fight, defend, 
and deter, not to reduce commitment, not to disengage but to engage more 
comprehensively.  It is to exploit new technologies and capabilities and adapt to new 
threats.  The final result will be a stronger more effective commitment to allies.  “And 
after what was done in Iraq…no ally or friend should doubt either our capability or our 
political will to defend our interests and to defend our friends.226  Representative Jim 
Leach underscored Mr. Rodman’s comments by stating that from a U.S. congressional 
perspective, regardless of how the executive branch rearranged forces to optimize 
capability, America has no desire to downgrade its commitment in the Pacific; instead, it 
fully supports maintaining, even upgrading its commitment to Pacific friends and 
allies.227  These are the kinds of political statements required to reinforce U.S. 
commitment to friends and allies and to continuing deterring threats. 
In addition to strong diplomacy, the United States must continue to show strength 
of action to reassure allies and deter foes.  According to Jonathan Pollack, chairman of 
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the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College, the United States requires 
“the arrangements, the access, the collaboration, the training, the exercise profile that 
make it credible when and if you have to act.”228  Increasing engagement activities 
enhances the credibility of U.S. commitment in the region. 
2. Increase Engagement Activities 
Exercises are visible demonstrations of U.S. commitment to the region.  They 
improve interoperability and readiness, and demonstrate America’s ability to form and 
lead effective coalitions.  Exercises promote burden sharing on the part of friends and 
allies and facilitate integration.  They exhibit America’s capabilities and resolve, and 
provide realistic conditions for working with the technologies, systems and procedures 
that are critical in times of crisis.  International exercises also provide familiarity with the 
host country including an understanding of its cultures, values and habits.229 
Major General Joseph F. Weber, a previous commander of the 3rd Marine division 
in Okinawa Japan emphasized the importance of maintaining a physical military presence 
in Asia via bilateral and combined exercises.  This type of military cooperation with 
allies and friends reinforces to potential terrorists and rogue nation threats the message 
that the United States and its allies intend for them to behave.230 
The United States is already expanding its engagement activities with the region.  
America and Australia announced that they would develop a new hi-tech training facility 
in northern Australia.  The new joint training facility will link U.S and Australian 
command and communications centers to help provide a common intelligence picture.  
While the new training facility enhances existing relations between Australia and the 
United States it does not allow for the permanent stationing of American forces.231  U.S. 
equipment and munitions will be pre-positioned at these training locations.  Australia has 
also agreed to partner with the United States on missile defense.  Thailand has also 
agreed to accept equipment stockpiles but no permanent stationing of troops, while the 
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Philippines will accept more troops in its attempts to stamp out terrorism within its 
territory.  And Singapore is already a growing refueling and maintenance shelter for U.S. 
ships but it is unable to handle large numbers of ground troops as it already exports much 
of its military training to Australia.232 
 Under a new “strategic framework,” Singapore will strengthen its security 
relationship with the United States.  Singapore’s Coordinating Minister for Security and 
Defense Tony Tan stated that Singapore will fall short of becoming a U.S. ally, but as a 
strong friend it will broaden its defense and security cooperation with the United States.  
Tan also believed that a U.S. presence continues to contribute to regional stability and 
that U.S. military effectiveness would not diminish if troops were removed from Korea 
and Japan.233 
3. Improve U.S. Capabilities at Home 
Because access issues are still prevalent and they point to shortfalls in U.S. 
military capabilities, the United States should focus research, development and 
technology to overcoming these limitations.  Weapon systems with longer range and 
greater precision, capabilities to launch against objectives without moving forces ashore 
or providing access in remote locations without the advantage of ports or airfields will 
better prepare the United States to face the challenges of the future.  However, even if 
America has the ability to accomplish an objective alone that approach may not always 
be the best course of action.  Maintaining coalitions of like-minded nations minimizes 
backlash against the United States when compared to the times when it acts unilaterally. 
When commenting about the necessity to change force posture, Admiral Arthur 
Cebrowski stated the United States must look to new approaches in positioning its forces.  
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, American forces were garrisoned forward in Kuwait and the 
United States heavily reinforced that garrison to launch missions against objectives 
within Iraq.  However, he said that operations from garrisons forward were becoming 
more vulnerable to military threats and political criticism.  He proposed operational  
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maneuvers from strategic distances and operational maneuvers from the sea could solve 
some of these problems by providing more security for our forces and minimizing the 
need to seek access approval.234 
The United States can reduce its reliance on other nations for access by building 
FSLs.  These forward support locations are intended to support power projection.  Spares, 
equipment, and munitions could be pre-positioned at these locations, which should be 
built where access is either guaranteed or highly likely.  Extensive RAND analysis 
strongly suggests that properly located and outfitted FSLs offer significant leverage in 
enabling both rapid and sustainable expeditionary operations.  Alaska, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and Diego Garcia are great options for FSLs.  Taken together, these locations put 
most of the world within C-130 range of a permanent center of American power 
projection capability.  While engagement does not necessarily equate to “assured” access, 
close security relations with potential hosts do appear to facilitate cooperation.  Contact 
between America and its partners helps develop common perspectives on key issues and 
encourages the pursuit of joint goals and objectives.235 
One area that would serve as a perfect FSL is Guam, where America is already 
developing its power projection capabilities on the outskirts of Asia.  General William J. 
Begert, Pacific Air Forces commander discussed the advantages of using Guam in the 
U.S. global force repositioning strategy.  “Guam, first of all, is U.S. territory.  I don’t 
need overflight rights.  I don’t need landing rights.  I always have permission to go to 
Guam.  It might as well be California or New Jersey.”236  The Air Forces is discussing 
plans to deploy a wing of advanced fighters to Guam along with a fuel tanker squadron, 
and a group of Global Hawk surveillance planes to complement an assortment of 
bombers.  The Air Force is also exploring “Flexbasing” a global system of tiered 
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locations for deploying its forces that includes Guam as a centerpiece in its strategy.237 In 
addition, the U.S. Navy is increasing its capabilities on Guam, including adding 
submarines and ships to its ports and discussing plans about stationing a second carrier on 
the island.  Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, commander U.S. Pacific Command said that 
“Guam’s geo-strategic importance cannot be overstated.  Both Navy and Air Force 
facilities will continue to figure prominently in Guam’s increasing role as a power 
projection hub.238    
The U.S. Army is working on Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) that are 
designed to deter or defeat aggression and other challenges to U.S. interests without 
establishing a permanent presence.  A key characteristic of FDOs is that they do not put 
U.S. forces at risk until the political decision has been made to apply decisive military 
force.  Even when U.S. ground forces are not already present, early arriving ground 
forces demonstrate American commitment, to both friends and foes, and they potentially 
deny the aggressor the prospect of an easy victory.239  In the event of a North Korean 
attack, the U.S. could deploy CONUS-based air, sea, and land forces, including Army 
heavy brigades, whose personnel would be airlifted to Korea, where they would man pre-
positioned equipment sets.  These pre-positioned sets diminish the need for rapid 
deployment because they focus on the initial days of the campaign while America’s 
strategic sustainment forces gear up.240 
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Rapid advances in U.S. technology, including precision-guided weapons, stealth 
bombers and integrated command, control, and communications have provided a stand-
off capability and increased military superiority over any other country.  The integration 
of this technology into its armed forces through transformation initiatives allows the 
United States to deal with potential threats on its own terms and provides a powerful 
deterrent without relying on the traditional conventional or nuclear methods.241 
The U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo manifested some of the latest 
ongoing transformation trends within the U.S. Armed Forces, including the employment 
of an effects-based or capabilities-based type of warfare.  The United States demonstrated 
that its military could operate half-way around the globe without a forward-based 
infrastructure and when necessary, it could carry that infrastructure forward.  On the 
other hand, these wars also demonstrated that U.S. forces still rely heavily on the ability 
to obtain and maintain access within a region to successfully and efficiently conduct 
operations.  While America demonstrated global reach capabilities with its long-range 
bombers and strategic airlift, and displayed awesome tactical and amphibious strike 
capabilities with its naval forces far from the battlefield, it still required access to bases 
and facilities within the region to facilitate refueling and support operations. 
In terms of applicability to other potential conflicts around the world, such as the 
Korean Peninsula, the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo have demonstrated that 
“access” not permanent bases, and “capabilities” not sheer personnel and equipment 
numbers are the limitations in future conflicts.  Maintaining U.S. bases and forces in 
Japan and Korea do not guarantee that these nations will support the United States or 
even allow access in a future conflict.  France would not allow overflight rights to the 
United States when it was striking Libya in response to a disco bombing.  Despite having 
U.S. bases and troops on its soil, Turkey denied the United States the ability to launch an 
offensive strike against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The United States invested 
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huge sums of money into building facilities and installations in places like Saudi Arabia; 
yet, was unable to use those facilities when it needed them to fight against Iraq.242 
Even Japan, one of the staunchest American allies, hesitates over approving 
elements of the U.S. transformation/force repositioning strategy in Asia.  The current 
plan calls for consolidating all elements of U.S. military services headquarters in Japan.  
From a Japanese perspective, this plan would increase Japan’s level of cooperation with 
the United States in security issues including concerns outside the region.  Some Japanese 
think that such moves would give U.S. forces in Japan control over operations in the 
Middle East and that would entangle the Japanese in issues that are beyond the scope or 
in violation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.243 
While it may be true that access issues have never stopped an operation in which 
the United States was seriously committed, without access, the operation becomes more 
difficult and more costly.  Access may be afforded by various methods; however, there is 
no such thing as assured access.244  The potential for access increases when a mutually 
beneficial relationship between nations exists and while engagement does not guarantee 
assured access, close security relations do facilitate cooperation and this cooperation 
helps develop common perspectives and fosters partnerships on mutual goals and 
objectives.245  Maintaining mutual defense treaties, military cooperation, combined 
exercises, shared intelligence, and base and port access rights in a contingency can 
provide the same level of assurance to friends and foes alike.  Using such methods the 
                                                 
242 Rear Admiral Arthur J. Johnson, Commander of Naval forces on Guam made these comments 
when comparing the benefits of having U.S. autonomy in Guam versus the unknown support of other 
nations.  See James Brooke, “Looking for friendly Overseas Base, Pentagon Finds it Already Has One,” 
New York: The New York Times, 7 April 2004.   
243 Nao Shimoyachi, “Pullout of U.S. Forces Could Skip Japan,” Japan Times, 18 August 2004. 
244 The various methods of access include the following:  permanent bases in allied countries that the 
United States is bound by treaty to defend; substantial presence to support ongoing military operations; and 
country visits for education, training, exercises, or contingency operations.  At permanent bases overseas, 
host nation approval is required for operations that are not directly linked to the defense of the host nation 
and approval is not guaranteed, as was the case when Turkey did not allow American forces in Turkey to 
engage in operations against Iraq.  In places like Saudi Arabia where we have ongoing operations the 
troops are expected to depart after the mission objective is complete; yet even in these circumstances the 
host nation can deny the United States use of its facilities to launch against objectives it does not support.  
Country visits are subject to host nation invitation or approval.  See David Shlapak, “Providing Adequate 
Access for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces,” in Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro’s Strategic 
Appraisal:  United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 351.  
245 David Shlapak, “Providing Adequate Access for Expeditionary Aerospace Forces,” 361. 
75
United States demonstrated its continuing commitment to the Philippines after 
eliminating its permanent presence, and still maintained peace and stability in the region.    
The latest U.S. conflicts also demonstrated that alliances and coalitions, 
overmatching capabilities, and access and pre-positioning of equipment and supplies 
were crucial for success; however, the pre-positioning of troops or a permanent forward 
presence was not essential.  The movement of troops is discussed in terms of days as 
opposed to the months required for the transportation of equipment.  Given the likelihood 
that future conflicts will resemble the new way of war demonstrated in Europe the 
Middle East, Afghanistan, and the global war on terror, withdrawing forces from Korea 
and Japan will not undermine these keys to success.  By strengthening alliances, 
participating in joint and combined military exercises, and increasing overall cooperation 
with our friends and allies, the United States can continue to build like-minded partners 
who share the same values and goals.  Fostering strong alliances will help the United 
States maintain its access, its ability to pre-position equipment and supplies, and its 
capability to surge forces into allied countries as required. 
The permanent physical presence of military forces does not guarantee Japan or 
Korea will side with the United States in a conflict with China over Taiwan or in a global 
war against terror.  Japan and Korea will side with the United States when America has 
won them over with shared values, goals, and interests; with the right justification of its 
cause; with the strength of its alliance; and with the capability and commitment of its 
forces to defend mutual interests in peace, stability, and freedom around the world.  This 
partnership is not won or guaranteed by a permanent military presence within the allied 
country, but by fostering relations between nations, by using diplomacy, by training and 
exercising together, and by demonstrating the capability and commitment to respond as 
America says it will respond. 
Finally, the evolution of the U.S. military force structure and forward positioning 
strategy may be analogous to the change in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons strategy within 
the Republic of Korea. When the United States under the leadership of President Bush 
decided in 1991 to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Korea did deterrence fail or 
instability prevail?  No!  On the contrary, despite initial protests and arguments from both 
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the Japanese and South Korean governments to keep the tactical nuclear capability within 
the Republic of Korea, the United States convinced its friends and allies, as well as its 
potential enemies, that the capability lost by removing tactical nuclear weapons was more 
than compensated under the overarching, protective umbrella of the strategic nuclear 
weapons based in the United States.246  In essence, in terms of capability and its impact 
on reassuring allies and dissuading enemies, the existence and threat of a better, more 
capable weapon system positioned outside the region could accomplish the same 
objectives of a less capable, redundant weapon system within the region, and thus 
precluded the physical presence of such tactical forces.  In much the same way, the U.S. 
military has developed and demonstrated such advanced asymmetric military capabilities 
that global reach and sustainment goals are within its normal purview, so as to preclude 
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